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CHAPTER

1

"SATAN AND LUCIFER"
When Franklin Roosevelt met with Winston Churchill
at Quebec

in August of

1943 the conference was publicly

billed as dealing with military matters affecting both the
Pacific and European theaters of war. By this time the

military situation had turned decidedly in favor of the
Soviets were delivering smashing blows to the

Allies. The

Germans on the eastern front, the North African campaign
against Rommel had been successful and Anglo-American forces
were completing operations in Sicily. However,
of American Secretary of State Cordell Hull

the presence

and British

Foreign Minister Anthony Eden led to press speculation that
postwar political issues were also on the agenda. As the

military situation became more favorable the wartime
political alliance seemed to deteriorate.

Postwar political issues began taking on greater

significance in early 1943, and would occupy more and more
of FDR's thinking as the year progressed.

William

C.

Union wrote

Bullitt,
a

In January,

former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet

lengthy memorandum to Roosevelt in which he

outlined his fears that Stalin would attempt to dominate
Europe at the end of the war. Bullitt, in

1

a

speech at New

York in July 1941, shortly after the Nazi invasion of
Russia, likened the struggle between the two totalitarian

powers as "a war between Satan and Lucifer." He concluded
the best course of action for the U.S.

would be to let the

Germans and Russians fight it out among themselves in the
belief that the winner would be so weakened as to no longer

threaten Europe.

[1]

The very military successes which prompted the

decision to meet at Quebec were at the heart of Bullitt's

memorandum to FDR

.

It

was now apparent that the Soviets not

only stopped Hitler's Wehrmacht in 1942, but, with the

encirclement and destruction of Paul us

'

Sixth Army at

Stalingrad, were poised to begin throwing the Germans back
in 1943.

Bullitt

f

s

current concern seems to have been that

Satan [or Lucifer, he did not designate which country

represented whom] was about to emerge from the struggle, but
not in the weakened condition originally forecast.

FDR seems to have been impressed with Bullitt's

argument, who said that the closer the Allies came to

defeating Germany the less influence they would have on
getting Stalin to agree on any postwar agreements. Now was
the time to apply pressure while "Your club would have lead
in it,

not cotton." He suggested that FDR threaten

a

Pacific

first strategy, reduction in aid to the Soviets, possible

2

]

difficulty in providing postwar aid to rebuild the
Soviet
Union,

and expressing full opposition to "predatory
Soviet

policy in Europe and Asia." He also advocated striking
against Germany through the Balkans rather than France, but
only if that decision were based on sound military

considerations. FDR met with Bullitt to discuss the memo and
asked him to continue to keep him informed on his thinking

regarding the political situation as he saw it. [2]
The President also raised the issues contained in

Bullitt's memo with British Foreign Minister Eden in March.
He

asked if Eden believed that Stalin's ultimate aim was to

dominate and communize Europe. Eden responded there was no
way to know for sure, but that even if that were his

intention the Allies should continue

to

work with him and

assume he intended to honor his treaty obligations. Eden
added he was surprised by Roosevelt's belief that Poland

would not prove to be
end of the war.

a

difficult question to resolve at the

FDR felt territorial concessions of East

Prussia and parts of Silesia would make Poland
if

a

net gainer

the Curzon Line were accepted as its eastern border.

According to Eden, FDR was also prepared to accept Russian
demands on Finland and the Baltic States, but hoped the

Russians would conduct plebiscites to ratify their
actions

.

[

3

3

.

Complicating the political situation was the German
announcement in April of the discovery of
the Katyn Forest of eastern Poland.

a

mass grave in

The grave contained the

remains of some 10,000 Polish army officers. The Germans

claimed the Russians massacred the Polish officers after

occupying eastern Poland in 1939. Stalin immediately denied
the charge, claiming instead that the Germans themselves had
killed the Poles. FDR and Churchill supported Stalin's

position,

arguing the Germans were attempting to sow

dissension among the allies, and also to distract worldwide
attention from their own massacre then underway of Jews in
the Warsaw ghetto.

However, in London,

the Polish

government-in-exile requested an investigation of the charge
by the

International Red Cross. Stalin immediately severed

relations with the London Poles, further complicating the
situation
While the Allies were struggling to maintain

a

semblance of unity in the face of the Katyn accusations FDR
began making plans to meet with Stalin one-on-one. While

Churchill had already held face-to-face meetings with the
Soviet Premier, the President had yet to meet his Russian

counterpart.

In early May,

as FDR and Churchill

were

preparing for the Trident Conference, to be held in
Washington, the President sent former Ambassador to the

4

Soviet Union Joseph Davies to Moscow. Davies was to
relay to

Stalin the President's desire to meet sometime in July,

without the presence of the British. Stalin initially agreed
to

the meeting,

but expressed doubts to Davies that such

a

meeting could take place in the absence of the opening of

a

second front in Europe.
Davies reported to FDR that failure to open the

promised second front would have far-reaching consequences
on Soviet attitudes on the prosecution of the war and their

participation in the peace. Stalin's trust in his allies was
obviously diminishing. Whether he believed the Allies were

deliberately holding back and letting the Germans and
Russians slug it out, as Bullitt had publicly suggested, is
uncertain.

He

did believe that the Soviets were carrying the

brunt of the fighting,

and expected another major German

offensive in the summer. He also believed the successful
North African campaign and the Allied air offensive against

Germany were insufficient substitutes for the promised

cross-Channel attack. [4]
The results of the Trident Conference were exactly

what Stalin feared. Churchill persuaded FDR to postpone the

cross-Channel attack in favor of securing the Mediterranean,
and possibly driving

Italy out of the war. Stalin sent an

angry reply to Roosevelt's cable informing him of the

5

Trident decisions. The Soviets could not consent to
these
agreements, again reached without Soviet participation,
"and

without any attempt at

a

joint discussion of this highly

important matter and which may gravely affect the subsequent
course of the war." Churchill, now aware that FDR was

planning to meet with Stalin without him, began pressing for
a

Big Three meeting. Stalin refused, citing pressing needs

on the eastern

front which required his presence, although

the Germans had not mounted

expected

.

[5

a

major summer offensive as

]

So as FDR and Churchill came together at Quebec

for

their sixth meeting of the war the political alliance seemed
to be coming apart.

Stalin's reaction to this meeting was as

acrimonious as his earlier cable to FDR, "To date it has
been like this: the U.S.A. and Britain reach agreement
bet we en themselves while the U.S.S.R.

is

agreement between the two powers as

third party looking

a

informed of the

passively on." [6]
The Soviet Premier continued to express

growing

distrust of his allies. Quebec demonstrated his allies
growing distrust of him. The conference produced

agreement regarding the Tube Alloys Project

-

a

secret

the atomic

bomb. The agreement stipulated that the weapon would never
be used by either partner against the other or against

6

a

third party without the consent of the
other. It also

stipulated that information about the project
could not be
passed to a third party except by mutual consent.
This in

effect gave both FDR and Churchill

a

veto over informing

Stalin about the development of the bomb or sharing

information about it. [7]
FDR did press the British about committing to the

cross-Channel attack in the Spring of 1944 at Quebec. They
also agreed to pursue
Fall.

a

meeting of the Big Three later that

When the meeting broke up both men took short

vacations before returning to Washington for further
discussions.

Historians have repeatedly attempted to

determine just what Roosevelt's thinking was at this
critical juncture, as preparations began for the first
meeting of the Big Three later that year at Teheran. The

controversy seems

to

revolve around just how much FDR's

conversations with Bullitt and Eden earlier in the year
reflected his real thinking, and how much may have been pure
speculation. Herbert Feis contends these early discussions
were an "exercise in imagination" and that "the record of

these discussions leaves the impression that they were

conducted in

a

vacuum." Gaddis Smith, on the other hand,

argues that policy was being based on

a

combination of

naivete and stereotypes held by FDR and his advisors. This

7

resulted in

formulation of policy "on the basis of hopes

a

and illusion rather than ascertainable fact."
Robert Dallek

presents yet another position contending that Roosevelt
was
indeed influenced by Bullitt's arguments and that
"he
was

uncertain about postwar relations with Russia, he wished
to
assure against the possibility that Stalin aimed at

extensive European control." [8]
By the

September

1,

time Churchill arrived in Washington on

Italy had accepted the surrender terms of the

Allies. The President invited Archbishop Francis
of New York to

J.

Spellman

dine at the White House along with the Prime

Minister. The following morning FDR met privately with

Spellman for more than an hour. The Archbishop recorded his

impressions of what the President said in

a

two-page memo

that he sent to the Vatican, to his longtime friend and

mentor Pope Pius XII. This document presents

a

very

different picture regarding the firmness of FDR's views on
the postwar world.

According to Spellman, FDR forecast

a

postwar world dominated by "spheres of influence" among the
"big four." China would have the dominant interest in the
Far East;

the U.S.

in the Pacific;

Britain and Russia in

Europe and Africa. However, Spellman said FDR believed

Russia would dominate Europe because of Britain's

"predominately colonial interests." While Chaing Kai-shek

8

would be consulted on "the great decisions
concerning

Europe" he would have no influence on them.
Moreover, the
U.S.

would be in much the same position as Chaing
on

European matters "although to

a

lesser degree." FDR hoped

the Russian domination of Europe "would not be
too harsh,"

according to Spellman, "Although that might be wishful
thinking. "[9]
It

is interesting to note

from this portion of

Spellman's memo that FDR did not foresee
the U.S.

in Europe after the war.

a

major role for

Much of what the President

did in the remaining months of the war takes on new meaning

when seen from this perspective.

Spellman restated the President's desire to establish
a

personal relationship with Stalin. He would seek

a

meeting

with Stalin as soon as possible in the belief that he was

better able to reach an accommodation with the Soviet leader
than Churchill. Stalin's postwar territorial aims were

outlined,

"He would certainly receive;

Finland,

the Baltic

States, the Eastern half of Poland, Bessarabia." The

President had decided, according to Spellman, that there was
no sense

in opposing these territorial desires of Stalin's

because he had the power to get them anyway. In essence FDR

acknowledged that he would accept the Soviet frontiers in
existence on June 21, 1941, the date of the German invasion

9

of Russia.

Stalin had been pressing for the recognition
of
these borders since December of 1941. He
had proposed
a

secret protocol to Foreign Minister Eden to
the treaty of
alliance between Russia and Britain. Both the
British and
the U.S.

had opposed the recognition of these borders.
FDR

outlined for Spellman the same position he took in his

discussions with Eden in March; the Baltics would be
absorbed by Russia, eastern Poland would be taken as well.
FDR then went on to outline for Spellman more far

reaching consequences of the changing military and political
situation,
Spellman,

far more than he revealed to Eden.

According to

FDR confirmed to him the probability that Stalin

would attempt to set up communist governments in the areas
not incorporated directly into the Soviet Union. The

President conceded that Austria, Hungary and Croatia would
"fall under some sort of Russian protectorate." When the

archbishop asked if the Allies intended to support

noncommunist elements in those countries to help prevent
communist takeovers FDR replied "no such move was

contemplated." The President seemed to be agreeing with the
most pessimistic evaluation of Soviet aims outlined by

Bullitt in January. [10]
The picture presented here contrasts sharply with

those of an undecided, naive President about to embark on an
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attempt to prevent Soviet power from expanding
in Europe.
Rather, he has

a

firm grasp of the postwar realities created

by the increasing military strength of the
Soviet Union. He

believes the Soviets will be the dominant power in
Europe.
He believes the Soviets will attempt to install
communist

governments in several eastern European countries, and is
making no plans to counter such
archbishop,

a

development. FDR told the

and through him the Vatican,

that all of eastern

Europe from the Baltic States to the Balkans will be either

incorporated into the Soviet Union or fall under Soviet
domination. Furthermore, he will do nothing to assist or
support elements within those countries which might resist
such

development, and the United States and Britain cannot

a

fight the Russians to prevent their takeover of eastern

Europe. The arguments put forth by Bullitt to prevent the

expansion of Soviet power have been rejected.
The fact that Spellman swiftly notified the Vatican of
the president's postwar outlook is clear evidence of his

concern over what FDR had confided to him. The prospect of
Poland,

the Baltic States,

Czechoslovakia

-

Hungary, Austria and

all predominantly Catholic countries

-

coming under communist influence was not something the

Vatican would take lightly. The question remains why FDR
would be telling the Archbishop of New York all this in the
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first place? Surely he knew Spellman would
inform the

Vatican of this discussion. He also risked the
possibility
the information would leak to the press and
create
of

a

storm

protest. The answer seems to lie in the fact that this

was not

a

new initiative on FDR's part, but rather

a

confirmation to the Vatican of an already established trend
of

thinking on postwar problems. The evidence seems to

suggest that FDR had reached decisions on the need to

accommodate the extension of Soviet power in Europe as early
as mid-1942,

and conveyed this to the Vatican through his

personal representative Myron
In August

of

1942,

C.

Taylor.

while Italy was still an active

member of the Axis alliance, Taylor was spirited into Rome
for meetings with the Pope and his top advisors.

Sumner

Welles, Assistant Secretary of State and FDR's man in the

State Department,

initiated the idea to send Taylor back

to

Rome in the midst of hostilities. FDR agreed "that it would
be useful

for Myron Taylor to go back to the Vatican .... But

how can we get him there." Arrangements were apparently made

through the Italian Government in the belief that Taylor
would transmit to the Pope conditions under which the

Italians could withdraw from the war. The records of

Taylor's meetings with the Pope, however, reveal that much
more was being discussed,

and the
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Italian situation was

]

rarely mentioned

.[ 11

Taylor seemed intent on conveying to Pius XII,
and his
Secretary of State Cardinal Luigi Maglione, the
nature of

postwar Europe, and in particular the role of Russia.
Taylor

stressed the Russian signature to the Atlantic Charter
"which,

among other things, asserts adherence to the

principle of religious freedom, and by its expressed
attitude toward Poland, the Baltic and Balkan States, in the

discussion of postwar settlements," had led the

administration to believe "the field is open for

collaboration

-

and generous compromise." Taylor impressed

upon the Pope and his advisors the need for Russian

cooperation at the end of the war without which "the future
stability of Europe" would be endangered. Russia would gain
security through an effective international organization
dedicated to the prevention of German rearmament, and in
return would be asked only to "cease her ideological

propaganda in other countries, and to make religion really
free within her borders." According to Taylor,

the Pope and

his advisors were very impressed with the fact that

consideration of postwar matters was already well under way.
[12]

Taylor met privately the following day with Cardinal

Secretary of State Maglione and again brought up the

13

]

question of Russia and her postwar attitude
"which is very
much in the minds of everyone here." He
raised the

possibility of establishing

a

"buffer organization of states

...between Germany and Russia" to ensure Russian
security
and reducing her need "to gain territory
in the less rich

areas surrounding her on the west." Taylor did
not spell out
just how this "buffer organization of states"
was to be

created, only that the matter was under consideration

.[ 13

The evidence seems to suggest that FDR developed

a

postwar strategy very early in the war, much earlier than

historians have commonly thought. He communicated important
elements of that plan to the Vatican as early as September
1942,

while the Allies were still on the defensive (the

battle of Stalingrad was just beginning). Historians have

largely overlooked FDR's wartime communications with the
Vatican as

a

he planned

to

source for providing

a

clear indication of what

accomplish. For example, British Foreign

Minister Eden was taken by surprise in March of 1943 when
FDR suggested that Poland would not present

problem to resolve at the end of the war.

a

difficult

FDR suggested to

him that East Prussia and parts of Silesia would more than

compensate Poland for possible loss of territory to Russia
in the east.

Prior to Taylor's departure for discussions

with the Pope the State Department prepared "a special map

14

of

Germany" for Taylor based on "The instruction

... to

show

the Germanized Slav sandy plain of
Brandenburg." The

commentary accompanying the map states "Practically
all of
Pomerania, Brandenburg, Silesia and the Kingdom
of Saxony
are still inhabited by

a

stock whose anthropological

characteristics are basically Slav." The document goes
on

to

state that "Polish sovereignty at no time extended
over so
wide an area,

but stopped at the western frontier of

Silesia, some miles west of the Oder River," and concluded
with the comment that "For purposes of the present map, the

Oder has been selected as the western limit of the

Germanized Slav area," and that it approximated the
westernmost extension of Polish rule. As Taylor left for
Rome in September of 1942 he carried with him the outline of

possible future borders of Poland which Roosevelt would
allude to six months later to Foreign Minister Eden. [14]
Yet another element of Roosevelt's postwar thinking is

revealed in the Taylor documents. Upon leaving Rome, Taylor
went to London where he held conversations with Averell

Harriman and Soviet Ambassador Ivan Maisky on the subject of

developing "a brief formula that would be the basis for

a

declaration by Stalin that would encourage the thought that
religion in Russia would actually be free." While in London
he

sought the opinion of one of the leading authorities on
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the Soviet Union concerning the
question of religion in

Russia,

and what effect that might have within
territories

occupied by the Soviets after the war. George
Kennan, then
temporarily assigned to the embassy in Lisbon,
outlined in
three page memorandum dated October

2,

1942,

a

the Soviet's

hostility to the Russian Orthodox Church and religion
in
general. Kennan related

a

number of instances of

a

"great

resurgence" of religious life in German occupied areas of
Russia. While acknowledging the accounts may have been

exaggerated by the Germans for their own propaganda
purposes, he concluded they "are naturally not without their

effects on the religious populations of the other eastern

European countries," and "They doubtless tend to increase
the horror with which these people view the prospect of

Russian occupation after the war." [15]
As
it should

a

result of these wartime experiences, Kennan said

"be evident to

anyone that

a

greater real

tolerance of religious life in Soviet controlled territories
would be in the interests of the Soviet Government itself,
both now and in the future." Kennan acknowledged the

difficulty of "achieving such cooperation and

understanding." The problem, as he saw it, lay not so much
with the concept of religious freedom itself, but with the

potential of foreign influence. He compared the communist

16

rulers of Russia with the Czars of the
15th and 16th
centuries who "fought Roman religious influence,
not so much
out of convictions of dogma as out of

influence on

a

fear of

foreign

backward and credulous people, so the present

rulers tend to feel that any foreign influence,
religious or

otherwise, challenges the security of their rule."
Kennan's

memorandum concluded, "If these preoccupations could
overcome and if the Kremlin could be induced

to

be

tolerate

religion at home and to receive the proffered cooperation of
western religious movements in the spirit of friendliness
and confidence,

I

believe one of the greatest barriers to

a

sound future peace would have been removed." [16]
Upon returning to the U.S. Taylor resumed

correspondence with Archbishop Edward Mooney of Detroit,
taking up with him the question of what type of statement
would be necessary from Stalin. Mooney told Taylor

profoundly convinced that

a

reliable,

a

'sine qua non'

sincere cooperation between America and Russia in post

war problems." Mooney,
an

am

authoritative

statement on religious freedom in Russia is
of

"I

like Roosevelt,

"utter realist" and that such

a

felt that Stalin was

statement could be

obtained "if we insist." However, the bishop also believed
that "an ambiguous or evidently insincere declaration would
be

fatal to the prestige of the President and to the

17

confidence which people must have in him
for the

if

his high ideals

post war settlement are to be realized

substantially." The President's reputation, and
acceptance
of

his postwar settlements,

ultimately hinged on their

acceptance by the American public.
That is why FDR seemed so concerned about keeping
the

Vatican well informed about potential postwar territorial

settlements. So much so in fact that he appears to have
informed the Pope and his advisors of his thinking some six
months before making similar thoughts known to his principal
wartime ally. What could the Vatican do? If, as Roosevelt
told Spellman,

the combined strength of

Britain and the

United States could not prevent Stalin from doing what he
wanted;

the

Vatican would surely be helpless.

The answer was that the Vatican was not entirely

helpless.

could sway worldwide Catholic public opinion,

It

and Roosevelt,

opinion,

the consummate politician,

knew this. Public

particularly Catholic opinion, might not have

counted for much in the Soviet Union under Stalin, but it

counted for

a

great deal in the United States under FDR.

Obviously, Roosevelt was well aware of the importance of the

Catholic vote to his national coalition. He had risen

to

political prominence in New York State, where the large,
we

1 1

-o r g a ni z e d

Catholic minority was important. On the

18

national level the same was true in several
key industrial
states of the northeast and Midwest, such
as Massachusetts,

Michigan and Illinois with their large bloc of
electoral
votes.

FDR always had

a

Catholic in his cabinet; James

Farley through the first two administrations in the

traditionally political position of Postmaster General.
When
Farley broke with Roosevelt over the third term issue
he

was

replaced with another Catholic, Frank Walker.

American Catholic opinion on the wartime alliance with
the Soviet Union was ambivalent at best.
on Russia in June of

The German attack

1941 suddenly turned one of the

European aggressor nations into an ally. Even the staunch

anti-communist Winston Churchill was willing to put the past
"with its crimes,

its follies,

and its tragedies" behind in

the hope that Russia could hold out long enough to let

England catch its breath. When the U.S. entered the war in

December American Catholics found themselves allied with an
ideological enemy of longer standing than Nazism.
Although Catholics were willing to fight Nazis
alongside Russians they, along with other Americans,

remained skeptical of any long-range alliance with the
Soviets. Catholic newspapers and periodicals continued to

remind readers of the nature of the Soviet dictatorship.

Commonweal

.

a

liberal Catholic journal reminded readers in

19

September of 1942, while Myron Taylor was
discussing postwar
issues with the Pope, that the record on
Soviet occupation
of Poland was much the same as
that of Nazi
Germany.

"What's

the difference between Nazi Germany
and Soviet Russia?"

asked Polish refugee Marta Wankowicz,

"In Russia it's

colder. "[17]
Now,

a

year later, FDR had confirmed to the most

powerful American Catholic prelate, and through him
the
Vatican,

his vision of

Catholics worst fears.

a

postwar Europe that confirmed
What was he willing to do? The

answer to this question would unfold over the course of
the

remainder of the war. The story has never been fully told,
but beginning with Taylor's mission to Rome in 1942 and

continuing through the Yalta conference, FDR attempted
mediate
Union.

a

He

to

rapprochement between the Vatican and the Soviet
knew the political risk of failure was great, and

might result in the loss of the large Catholic vote to the

Democratic Party.
Events moved rapidly in late 1943 and the long-awaited

meeting of the Big Three took place in November. Teheran,
more so than any of the other conferences of the war,

illustrated the basic interrelationship of domestic

political realities with the President's formulation of
foreign policy. Shortly after the first official meeting
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adjourned Stalin visited Roosevelt privately.
The President
outlined for Stalin his concerns about the 1944
presidential
election. In March FDR had told Eden that
reaching a

settlement on Poland would not present

a

problem.

But in

November FDR told Stalin there were six to seven
million
voters in the United States of Polish extraction
(virtually
all of them Catholic)
to

lose their votes.

and as
He

a

practical man he did not want

told Stalin he agreed with him on

the need to restore the Polish state but he could
not

participate in any decision on the subject. When Stalin
replied that he understood the president's position now that

matters had been explained to him, Roosevelt brought up the

similar problem he faced with American voters of Lithuanian,
Latvian,

and Estonian heritage

(also mostly Catholic).

FDR

told Stalin the United States would not go to war over the

issue when the Soviets reoccupied the Baltic Republics, but
the issue

for Americans would be the right of

self-determination. FDR raised the possibility of holding

a

plebiscite, as he had with Eden and Spellman, and told
Stalin he believed the people of the Baltics would vote

to

join the Soviet Union. Stalin replied that the Baltic States
had no autonomy under the czars and he saw no reason why the

issue was being raised now. When the president said the
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public "neither knows nor understands"
Stalin told him "They
should be informed and some
propaganda work done." [18]
The "realism" the president
spoke of to Spellman in

September was manifesting itself in terms
of American
presidential politics in November. The reality

was that FDR

did not want to risk losing the
Polish Catholic vote,

and

possibly the entire Catholic vote, over the
Polish border
issue.

FDR was well aware of the impact

a

president's

foreign policy decisions could have on domestic
political

alignments. As

a

vice presidential candidate in 1920 he had

seen the mass desertion of Irish Catholics from the

Democratic Party in the northeast that resulted from
Wilson's pro-British foreign policy and the crushing of the
Easter Rebellion.

The evidence presented from the Taylor

mission of 1942 clearly suggests that FDR was thinking in
much larger terms than simple ethnic considerations.
This work will attempt to analyze FDR's postwar policy

within the context of his relationship with American

Catholics. Throughout his Presidency he confronted many
issues,

both domestic and international,

finding

a

which hinged on

political solution acceptable to Catholic voters

and the Catholic hierarchy.

Virtually all of these involved

accusations of communist sympathies on his part, or within
his administration. To fully appreciate the perspective from
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which FDR was operating during these
critical war years it
is necessary to review these
incidents and the impact they
had on his decision to attempt the
seemingly impossible: a

rapprochement between the Vatican and the
Kremlin.
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2

"HE HASN'T TALKED ABOUT ANYTHING
BUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.

John Adams once remarked that "papists"
were as rare
in his

hometown of Braintree as comets and earthquakes.
The
scarcity of Catholics in the new American
Republic did not
prevent the founders from worrying about the
provisions

contained in Article Six of the proposed new
constitution.
This article prohibited

a

religious test to hold office in

the new federal government. Major Rusk of
Massachusetts

"shuddered at the idea that Roman Catholics, Papists, and
Pagans might be introduced to office." A delegate to the
North Carolina ratifying convention took

a

more long range

view arguing that he "did not suppose that the Pope could

occupy the President's chair," but that in "four or five
hundred years," it was possible "that Papists may occupy"
the Presidency.
In

fact,

[1]

it would take only 140 years

for

a

Catholic

to

seek the highest office in the land. By 1928, When Alfred

E.

Smith left Houston with the Democratic Party nomination,

the

face of America had changed.

The great waves of

immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century transformed the nation. As if the sheer size of the
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new immigration were not enough to
provide native Americans
with a sense of being overwhelmed,
the origin of the new
immigrants was even more frightening. Prior
to

95 percent of

the 1880's,

new immigrants came from northwestern
Europe.

The new wave was coming from southern
and eastern Europe:

Poles,

Italians, Russians, Lithuanians, Czechs,
Rumanians,

Spanish and Portuguese. As one historian has noted
"most
spoke no English," and,

perhaps more importantly,

"Protestantism was foreign to most." The bulk of the new
immigrants were Catholics, Jews and Eastern Orthodox.
[2]
Such huge numbers of Catholics seemed to many to

present

a

clear and present danger to the American way of

life. A midwestern scholar expressed his fear of the new

immigrants religion: "The church

to

which he [the southern

immigrant] gives allegiance is the Roman Catholic, and,

however much the Catholic Church may do for the ignorant

peasant in his European home, such instruction as the priest
gives is likely to tend toward acceptance of their

subservient position on the part of the working man." The
American ideal of the rugged individual as the basis for

American democracy was clearly challenged by the traditional

paternalism of the Catholic church. [3]
The great waves of immigration also transformed the

nation from predominantly rural to predominantly urban. The
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census of 1920 marked the
were

f

irst time

found to be living in cities.

a

majority of Africans

By 1900

the population of

seven of America's largest cities:
New York, Boston,
Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit and
Milwaukee, was over
seventy percent comprised of foreign-born
stock. Along with
the demographic shift came

Smith's nomination was

a

a

shift in political power.

harbinger of that change. Political

power was shifting from rural to urban America,
and urban

America was where Catholics were primarily concentrated.
This is dramatically demonstrated by figures released
in
1936 which showed that of the fifty largest cities in the
U.S.

forty one listed Roman Catholics as the largest single

segment of the population including Providence with 52
percent,
32,

Newark with 45,

and Milwaukee and St.

Boston 40,

Pittsburgh 35, Cleveland

Paul with 29.

[4]

Smith's nomination revived all the old fears of papal

conspiracies and anti-Catholic sentiment previously
manifested in the nativist movement of the 1840's, the Know
Nothing Party of the 1850's and the cry of "Rum, Romanism
and Rebellion" which characterized the election of

1884.

The

political resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920's was

associated with the anti-urban, anti-foreign, anti-Catholic
and anti-Semitic response to the great immigration in

addition

to

the anti-black orientation of the original Klan.

28

The crushing defeat suffered by
Smith cannot be attributed

solely to his Catholicism. Rather,
as historian Richard
Hofstadter has pointed out, no Democrat
could have defeated
Hoover in 1928. The combination of
prosperity, prohibition
and anti-Catholicism combined to
make Hoover's victory

overwhelming. Smith's candidacy represented
to most

Americans all the evils associated with the
immigrants:
Catholicism, corrupt big city political machines,
saloons,
crime and vice.
The importance of Smith's candidacy,
so

much in his defeat,

however, lies not

but in his ability to obtain the

nomination in the first place. Smith's nomination secured
the urban ascendancy within the Democratic Party,

ascendancy assured Catholics

a

and that

major role in the selection

of

any nominee of the party. A Catholic might not be able to

be

elected President, but no Democrat could hope to be

elected without the support of the major urban political
machines, which were predominantly Catholic.

Franklin

D.

Roosevelt understood this political shift

in power perhaps better than anyone.

His campaigns and

leadership reflected it. He rose to political prominence in
New York state where the large, well-organized Catholic

minority was important. He stayed on good terms with Tammany
while at the same time not becoming identified with its
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practices. He nominated Smith for the
Presidency in 1928
with his famous "Happy Warrior"
speech. Campaigning

vigorously for Smith he criticized both
the Klan and the
religious bigotry of the campaign. This
resulted in
a

large

residue of support for FDR among Catholics
as the 1932

campaign opened

.

As the depression deepened and the response
of the

Hoover administration continued to rely on the
traditional

American value of individual responsibility, and the ability
of

business to eventually correct the situation, Americans

began questioning the very basis of American culture. The

cultural clash between the "rugged individualism" of native

Protestant America and the "paternalism" of the huge numbers
of Catholic

immigrants seemed to collapse in the face of

millions of unemployed, hungry and hopeless workers. In May
of

1931,

Pope Pius XI issued the encyclical Quadraeesimo

Anno marking the fortieth anniversary of Pope Leo XIII's

encyclical Rerum Novarum ("On the Condition of Labor"). Pius

reaffirmed the teaching of his predecessor affirming the
right of private property, and condemning the socialistic

concept of communal ownership. However, Leo also condemned
the concentration of wealth and the evils resulting from the

modern industrial process. He asserted the obligation of
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owners and employers to provide
their workers with
"reasonable and frugal comfort." [5]
More importantly,

both pontiffs asserted that if

employers failed to recognize their obligations
to provide
for their employees "the public
authority must
step in to

meet them." In October of 1932,

approaching 13 million, FDR made

with unemployment
a

speech at Detroit quoting

approvingly from Pius XI's Quadrae^l
of the greatest documents of

as

I

M

Ann.

.

a11

^f

lt

»

one

all time," and "just as radical

am." Was the candidate hinting at the need for

government intervention in the economy on

a

broader scale

than his previous campaign statements suggested?
[6]

While FDR generally received support from American

Catholics on New Deal issues, which affected them directly,
he soon

found himself embroiled in

a

host of foreign-policy

questions which would place him in conflict with one of his
most important constituencies. The new President had been

Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Wilson administration
when the U.S. broke off relations with Russia following the

Bolshevik Revolution. Three succeeding Republican

administrations continued the nonrecogni tion policy, in
spite of the fact that most major world powers had come

around to the reality of dealing with the Soviet government.

During the campaign FDR sidestepped the question of
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recognition, but early in the new
administration it b e came
obvious he was seriously considering
the possibility. The
Catholic press and members of the church
hierarchy openly
questioned the wisdom of such a move.
Many Catholics were shocked when Al
Smith testified in
favor of Russian recognition before the
Senate Finance
Committee. He favored more trade with the
Soviets, and

dismissed their repudiation of World War
He

I

debts to the U.S.

noted that the U.S. sent troops to Russia to
help put

down the revolution although both countries were
technically
at peace.

Reverend Edmund

Walsh,

A.

Georgetown University, and

vice president of

leading Catholic authority on

a

communism, opposed recognition. Father Walsh headed the

Vatican Relief Mission to the Soviet Union from 1919 through
1924,

during which there had been much speculation that the

mission signaled
a

a

willingness of the Vatican to enter into

concordat with the Soviets. This Vatican mission was

affiliated with the American Relief Administration headed by
Herbert Hoover. The Russian experience left Walsh

anti-communist.

In

1950,

at

a

a

rabid

dinner in Washington, he would

council the junior Senator from Wisconsin, Joseph

R.

McCarthy, to make anti -communism the focus of his reelection

campaign: advice McCarthy would follow wholeheartedly.
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[7]

FDR sent

a

letter to Russian President Kalinin
in

October 1933 requesting

a

representative of the Soviet

government be sent to discuss outstanding
issues between the
two countries in the hope of reaching
a settlement. Foreign
Commissar Maxim Litvinov was given the
assignment. On
the

same day Roosevelt met with Father Walsh
to review the

issues. The President asked Walsh to prepare
a report on the
state of religion in Russia which he said would be used
when

serious negotiations began. Walsh quoted the President as
saying "leave it to me Father;

I

am

a

good horse dealer." At

the same time the Vatican was expressing its concern about
the possibility America would recognize the Soviet

government. Cardinal Hayes of New York was asked to express
to

FDR the Vatican's hope that he would raise the issue of

religious persecution in Russia during his talks with
Litvinov. Hayes submitted
to

a

list of proposals for Roosevelt

discuss. These included: freedom of conscience for

Russians and foreigners; freedom of worship, public and
private; liberation of persons imprisoned for their faith;
and cessation of propaganda against God.

[8]

Catholics were not the only Americans opposed to the

recognition of Russia. This division was reflected within
the administration where Secretary of State Cordell Hull and

Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace, both Protestants,
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joined with Postmaster General James
Farley,

a

Catholic, in

opposition, although Hull's opposition
was based largely on
the potential political consequences
of alienating
large

segments of Catholic Democrats. Hull
proposed negotiating
with the Soviets to permit freedom of
religion for American

nationals living in the Soviet Union. At this
stage

Auxiliary Bishop of Boston Francis Spellman
was brought into
the negotiations.

Rome,

While

a

student at the American College in

Spellman became the protege of Cardinal Secretary of

State Eugenio Pacelli. Spellman received

Enrico Galeazzi,

a

a

letter from Count

financial advisor to the Vatican, asking

him to convey to Roosevelt the Pope's desire to insist upon

religious freedom in Russia as

a

prerequisite to U.S.

recognition. Spellman appears to have communicated the
Pope's wishes through FDR's son James. [9]
When Litvinov finally arrived in Washington for the

talks which would lead to U.S. recognition, he was surprised
by the President's insistence on including the issue of

religious freedom in the discussions. Years later, in 1938,
Spellman recounted in

a

letter to his brother the

astonishment Litvinov expressed to William Bullitt.
According to Bullitt, after three days of talks Litvinov
exclaimed "I can't understand the President; he hasn't
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talked about anything but religious
freedom to me, and I
want to talk about important
things like trade relatio ns

"
.

[10]

After nine days of discussions FDR
and Litvinov
exchanged formal notes which extended
recognition to the
Soviet Union. In the notes the Soviets
agreed to cease

subversive activity in the United States,
to permit American
citizens in the Soviet Union free exercise
of religion and
to

negotiate

a

final settlement on financial claims. The

agreement seems to bear the imprint of Secretary
Hull's
position in that it recognized the right of Americans
to
worship freely in Russia. At the same time the
agreement
seems to have satisfied American Catholics. Monsignor
Keegan
of

New York congratulated Roosevelt on the manner in which

he

upheld "the vitally sacred principles which we Americans

hold so dear." Bishop Spellman recorded in his diary,

"Jack

Kelly and Mr. Galeazzi, whose names will never appear in

history did much to get President Roosevelt to insist that

American citizens at least should worship God as they wished
in Russia."

[11]

The resolution of the recognition of Russia question

established
in the

a

precedent which would play an important part

future relationship between FDR and American

Catholics. First, Catholics did not get exactly what they
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wanted. They had sought virtual total
recognition of freedom
of religion in Russia. The
recognition agreement provided
only for the right of Americans in Russia
to worship freely,

which amounted to the right of the embassy
staff to worship,
as there were virtually no other
Americans in Russia. At the
same time the President did raise the issue
of religious

freedom repeatedly and vigorously, as testified
to by the

comments of William Bullitt. The fact that FDR even
took
into account Catholic sensitivities was

major departure

a

from previous American administrations. His ability
to reach
a

compromise they found acceptable would become

his administration.

Finally,

the

feature of

issue of religious freedom

in the Soviet Union would continue to be
of

a

a

central feature

Roosevelt's future dealings with the Soviet Union, and an

important element of his thinking on the future postwar

settlement

36

.

NOTES
CHAPTER

2

:;.s::-;;:^,;;:,r i=.'^~>.

vnnwauxee, Bruce Publishing Co., 1964),

.

.

,

p. 105

Loren Baritz, The Good Life: The Meanin.
of Sllr r„ fig for
the^American Middle CJ^,
New York, Harper and Row" 1990
2)

,

(

Quoted in Baritz, The Good

3)

T.-i

£e

,

p. 25.

On foreign stock for America's cities
see Baritz, The
G °° d L1 * e
and on Catholic populations see Geo
P 27
rge~~Q
F1 y nn
American Catholics and Roosevelt p. 232.
4)

*

-

'

>

,

Francis L. Broderick, John A. Ry* n Rieht TWerend New
Dealer
(New Y °rk, The Macmillan Co., 1963
), pp. 19-20.

5)

:

»

George Q. Flynn, American Catholir.fi and the Roosevelt
Presidency: 1932-1936
(Lexington, University of Kentucky7
Press, 1968 ), p. 17.
6)

,

Robert A. Graham, S.J., Vatican Diplomacy: A Study of
Church and State on the In t ernational Plane
(Princeton,
N.J., Princeton University Press, 1959 ), p. 363. and Robert
Griffith, The Politics of F ear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the
Senate
(New York, Hayden Book Co. 1970), p. 29.
7)

.

,

Flynn,

8)

America n Catholics and Roosevelt

,

p.l35ff.

Robert I. Gannon, S.J., The Cardinal Spellman Story
(Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Co., 1962), p. 98.

9)

.

10)

Ibid

.

.

p. 157.

1 1

Ibid

.

,

p

)

.

98

.

37

),

.

CHAPTER

3

"MARX AMONG THE AZTECS"

As the issue of Russian recognition
was being

favorably resolved for the President another,

raore

perplexing problem arose which would haunt
the

administration throughout FDR's first term. American
Catholics had been concerned about the fate of
their

co-religionists in Mexico since 1913. The Church in Mexico
was closely aligned with the regime which was
overthrown
the revolution that year.

wrote

a

i

The new revolutionary government

constitution in 1917 containing several

anti-Catholic provisions. The hostility of the Mexican
government expressed itself in repeated instances of

anticlericalism. Several priests were murdered and churche
burned
The election of General Plutarco Elias Calles as

President intensified the problem, and injected the issue

anti-communism into the fray. Calles was arguably the most
radical in

a

series of revolutionary Mexican Presidents. A

true believer in the social and economic aspects of the

Mexican Revolution in 1925 he called for enactment of new
laws to enforce the land reform provisions of the 1917

constitution. One such law allowed foreigners to purchase
land,

but only if they renounced all rights of protection
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their own government. The second
law, called the petrol eum
law, declared subsoil deposits,
such as oil, were the

"inalienable and ^prescribable " property
of the nation.
Several American oil companies, used
to having their own way
in Mexico, refused to comply with
the new laws. Calls
for

American military intervention in Mexico
increased, and the
press picked up on the charges of the need
to prevent the
spread of bolshevism. The oil companies argued
that Mexico
was going the way of the Soviet Union,

provide

a

and would soon

base for the spread of communism throughout Latin

America

American Catholics were just as upset as the American
oil companies.

Calles began enforcing the anti-Catholic

provisions of the 1917 constitution which were largely
ignored by his predecessors Carranza and Obregon:

nationalizing church property, expelling foreign priests and
nuns, prohibiting religious instruction in private primary

schools and limiting the number of priests allowed to

perform religious functions in the various Mexican states.
Wh en Calles refused

to compromise on these

issues the Pope

took the extraordinary measure of authorizing an interdict

against Mexico, prohibiting the performance of public

religious rites

.

When FDR took office in March 1933, he appointed his
old friend and boss from his days in the Navy Department,
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Josephus Daniels, Ambassador to
Mexico. The appointment was
initially well received by both the
Catholic press and

spokesmen who viewed the appointment of
such
as

an indication

that FDR would use the ambassador to
exert

his influence in Mexican affairs.

gave

a

close friend

a

In late

speech in Mexico City, before

in which he quoted

a

July 1934, Daniels

seminar on education,

from President Calles on the importance

of education in Mexico's

future:

"We

must enter and take

possession of the mind of childhood, the mind of youth."
To
this Daniels added his own thoughts:

that aim,

"To

the carrying out of

which alone can give Mexico the high place

envisioned by its statesmen, the government is making the
rural school

a

social institution." [1]

What Daniels thought an innocent phrase comparing

Mexican efforts in education to the widely respected

American public school system provoked

a

furor among

American Catholics. Many immediately called for his
resignation. Father Coughlin told his huge radio audience
that the U.S. government "from Wilson down to our President

Roosevelt, has aided and abetted the rape of Mexico." The
issue was quickly transformed from

a

question of the rights

of private schools to the question of whether Mexico was

following in the footsteps of Russian communism. The issue
would not go away,

and in November,

Common we al

.

in an

editorial entitled "Mexico follows Russia," stated that "The
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ruling powers of Mexico are
seemingly determined to follow
Russia's example to the last and
most bitter degree." The
editors argued that Americans were
witnessing just across
the border "a full demonstration
of the
most

anti-democratic, anti-libertarian, anti-religious
tyranny
known in the modern world outside
Russia itself." [2]
Unlike the recognition of Russia question,
which
centered almost exclusively around the
official position of
the church hierarchy,

Catholic lay organizations became

actively involved in the Mexican issue.

In

New York,

Catholic students picketed the Mexican consulate. The
Catholic Evidence Guild, Ancient Order of Hibernians,
Catholic Daughters of America, Holy Name Societies, the
National Council of Catholic Women and even the

Massachusetts League of Catholic Foresters sent letters
the White House.

to

The group which took the lead in

criticizing the President, however, and which refused to let
go of

the

issue,

was the Knights of Columbus. [3]

Throughout 1934, 1935, and into the election year of
1936 the 500,000 member organization kept up
of

a

steady stream

criticism of the Roosevelt administration. Michael

H.

Carmody of New Haven, Connecticut, head of the organization,
requested

a

meeting with FDR in January of 1935 to discuss

the Mexican situation.

Carmody,

The President instead arranged

and the executive committee of the Knights,
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for
to

meet

with Secretary of State Cordell
Hull.

Following the meeting

with Hull the group termed the
discussion "very

satisfactory", but continued to lobby
influential Catholic
members of congress. Through the efforts
of Senator
David

Walsh,

from Carmody's neighboring state of
Massachusetts,

Senator William

E.

the Senate calling

Borah of Idaho introduced

a

resolution in

for an investigation "Into the

persecution of Christians... now being practiced
in Mexico,"
and

for senate resolutions protesting the

"anti-religious

campaign" being conducted in Mexico. [4]

Catholic newspapers editorialized in favor
of

the

Borah resolution,

and several

of

passage

prominent members of

the Catholic hierarchy spoke out in favor of it.

In an

editorial of February 15, 1935, CcjoiojiweaL acknowledged that
the Borah Resolution was not expected to pass.

But the

editors took issue with the Protestant periodical The

Christian Century, which had criticized the role of the
Catholic Church in Mexico, claiming the church had

"underwritten

a

blanket denunciation of socialism and

socialistic education." Commonweal's editors argued that

a

"common-sense" distinction had to be made "between the
'socialism' of social reformers and the
Marx,

Lenin,

and Mexico."

'socialism of say,

Bakunin and their modern exemplars in Russia
[5]
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Only

a

week earlier, on February

carried an article by William

T.

8,

1935,

Co mmon „ Pfl i

Walsh entitled "Is

Communism Dangerous" in which he
compared General Calles to
Stalin and criticized Daniels for
his public praise "...in
favor of

a

Communistic plan to transfer all control
of

children's education form the parent

to

perhaps even more ominously for FDR

Walsh quoted an article

in

,

the state." But,

the Saturday Review to the effect
that "collectivism in

some form is inevitable

Roosevelt's

'New Deal'

..

.sovietis.,

fascism and President

will be found in the long run,

despite apparent divergencies, to have been
fundamentally
the same thing." Not only were readers being
asked to equate

Mexico's revolution with Soviet Russia, but also to
equate

Roosevelt's New Deal with soviet style collect! vism

.

[

6

The administration took the position that the Borah

Resolution represented "a premature indictment of

a

friendly

neighboring government," and would hinder the development of
the President's Good Neighbor policy.

Nonetheless

a

petition

in the House garnered 242 signatures which was presented to

Roosevelt. The President needed to say something and put the
issue behind him. A second request for

a

meeting with the

President was sent by Carmody in April, and again was
referred to the State Department. This time, however, FDR

requested

a

reply be prepared that could be sent over his

signature. Commonweal returned to the issue that same month
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with an article entitled "Marx
Among the Aztecs." The
author, Dixon Wecter, equated Mexican
and Russian socialism
and collectivism, and reminded
readers that "In 1927

Secretary Kellogg sought

to

convince the Foreign Relations

Committee of the Senate that Communism was
receiving
official encouragement in Mexico." Official
encouragement?
Was Wecter implying that FDR was encouraging
communism in
one of our closest neighboring states?
The evidence seems to

suggest that this is precisely what was happening.
The

association with New Deal social programs promoting

collectivism

,

reluctance to challenge the Mexican

government and the Russian recognition issue were leading
many Americans,

both Catholic and non-Catholics alike to the

conclusion FDR's sympathies lay with some foreign ideology.
In May Bishop John F.

this concern in

a

Noll of Fort Wayne,

Indiana, expressed

letter to Roosevelt asking him to take

a

strong public stand on the religious freedom issue and "end
rumors of Roosevelt sympathy for communism ."[

7

Finally, in early July, the President met with Carmody
and

a

delegation from the Knights of Columbus. The group

again asked the President to speak out publicly against the

persecution of the church in Mexico. FDR, however, would
give the group no specific promise. After the meeting, the

Knights told the press he had been gracious but

noncommittal. Eight days later the President met with
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a

Congressional delegation on the same
subject, and used the
opportunity to issue a statement on
religious freedom which
said he wished to "make it clear
that the American people
and the Government believed in
freedom of religious worship
not only in the United States, but
also in other nations."
C8]

The Catholic press seemed relieved
by the statement.

Most took the position that Roosevelt had
spoken directly to
the Mexican situation,

although he had not mentioned Mexico.

Commonweal praised the statement as the forerunner
of an

international pact on religious freedom. The Catholic
journal America editorialized that "a major objective
of our
campaign on Mexico was achieved." It seemed as
though a

collective sigh of relief was taken by Catholic
opinion
leaders. The President had said something-anything-and
they
could now return to cementing relations with

they believed was taking
issues

a

a

President

genuine interest in Catholic

.

It

However,

seemed the President had put the issue to rest.
the Knights of Columbus were not so easily

mollified. At their annual convention at New York in August
the Knights passed

a

unanimous resolution authorizing

Carmody to send yet another letter to the President
expressing their regret at the President's apparent lack of
concern over matters in Mexico. In October, the National
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Board of Directors sent

a

vigorous letter of protest to FDR

arguing that the President's
statement on religious freedo*
fell far short of what was
needed. The letter concluded,
"You cannot escape responsibility
for throttling the Borah

Resolution... for the endorsement given
the Mexican
Government. .by your ambassador ... for
nonaction on behalf of
bleeding .. .Mexico " [9]
.

.

This time the Knights had gone too far. The
political
activism generated by the Mexican situation
was calling into

question who had the authority to speak for the
church.

Archbishop John

J.

McNicholas of Cincinnati issued

a

statement to be read in all churches of his archdiocese
stating that the Knights "in no sense speak for the priesthood or for the Catholic laity of Cincinnati." McNicholas
was correct in stating that the Knights did not speak for
the entire Catholic community.

The anti -communist rhetoric

which dominated much of the issue surrounding education in

Mexico would now be brought to

a

close with

a

symbolic

gesture from American Catholic education. Chicago's liberal

Cardinal George Mundelein would play

a

key role in bringing

the clamor created by the Knights latest letter to an

end. [10]
In November of

1935,

the University of Notre Dame,

the

most prestigious Catholic university in the country, invited

Roosevelt to receive an honorary degree. Frank Walker, Mayor
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of

Detroit and

a

Dame graduate,

close political advisor to FDR

,

and

a

Notre

appears to have been closely involved
with

the decision to present the degree
to the President in the

midst of the swirling controversy over
the Knight's letter.
Notre Dame president John O'Hara was
delighted with the

prospect,

and traveled to Washington to complete
the

arrangements. Cardinal Mundelein presided at
the

presentation at South Bend on December

9,

and said his

presence was to insure the President he was "among
friends."
The Cardinal,

in

a

direct reference to the Knight's

controversy, said no one group had the right to claim
to
speak for all Catholics. Secretary of the Interior Harold
Ickes confided to his diary that the Cardinal's speech

amounted to "a pretty complete endorsement of the

President." For his part FDR gave
the concepts of

a

ringing endorsement of

"Freedom of education and freedom of

religious worship" as

a

necessity for "true national life."

The sight of the President receiving an honorary degree

Notre Dame from

a

from

Cardinal of the church would surely put to

rest the idea that the President was secretly encouraging
the spread of communism.

FDR was thus able to move into the

election year of 1936 with what Arthur Krock of The New York
Times described as

a

Catholic endorsement of the President.

But 1936 would bring the President into yet more controversy
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with American Catholics,

and again the issue would be

communism, at home and abroad.
[11]
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CHAPTER
A COMMUNIST

IN

4

WASHINGTON'S CHAIR

The 1936 Presidential campaign
began in earnest in

January when Al Smith addressed

a

glittering gathering of

the nation's wealthy at Washington's
Mayflower Hotel.

The

sponsor of the evening was the American
Liberty League, a
self-proclaimed nonpartisan political group
organized in
1934.

The organization's principal sponsors,

however,

included business and industrial leaders
including Irenee Du
Pont, John J. Raskob, William S. Knudsen
and J. Howard Pew.
The Liberty League was opposed to virtually
every aspect of

Roosevelt's New Deal, viewing it as "creeping socialism"
at
best and outright communism at worst. The League
managed to

recruit both Smith and 1924 Democratic presidential

candidate John

W.

Davis as their spokesmen hoping that

having two former Democratic presidential candidates telling
the nation that the New Deal was

principles would cause

a

a

betrayal of American

split in the party and possibly

deny FDR the 1936 nomination.
A national

radio audience heard the onetime "Happy

Warrior" of the Democratic Party denounce the inflationary

spending policies of the administration, call for
to

a

return

the principles of state's rights and the need to honor

the constitution.

Smith said the choice was clear; America
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»

.

had to choose between
"Washington and Moscow,
of

Africa

or the

foul breath of

the pure air

co„unistic Russia...

the

stars and stripes or the red
flag of the godless ... Soviets
Smith said the President himself
was not a communist or a
socialist, but was being misled by
those around him. [1]
Jim Farley,

again heading the president's campaign,

claimed Smith had made
the

a

major mistake aligning himself with

very elements which had fought
against his run for the

presidency four years earlier. Farley
believed Smith had
alienated himself from the very working-class
constituency
which once formed the basis of his strength
within the

party
While Smith,

the only Catholic ever nominated by

a

major party to run for president, had broken
with FDR over
the New Deal early on,

another important former Catholic

supporter would soon do the same. Father Coughlin was
becoming more critical of FDR with each passing week.
Farley,

.

fearful of the priest's growing political strength,

attempted to reconcile the two. He arranged

a

meeting in

early January, but other than inquiring about the health of
their respective dogs, nothing was settled. Shortly after

praising the President's State of the Union address the
radio priest made his final break with FDR, charging that
the President's Brain Trust was communist infiltrated,

virtually the same thing Smith was saying. He apologized to
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hi, radio audience for his
earlier support of FDR and told
the* "The slogan 'Roosevelt
or Ruin' must now be altered
to
read 'Roosevelt and Ruin.
"[2]
'

The Catholic endorsement of
Roosevelt proclaimed by
Harold Ickes and Arthur Krock the
previous November now

seemed in doubt. Two of the most
popular Catholics in the
country were both accusing Roosevelt
of leading the nation
down the road to communism. How would
the President respond
to this new challenge?

Farley made the decision to take on the
Liberty League
direct confrontation in the Spring state
primaries. The
League was boasting of its strength in New York,
Rhode
in

a

Island,
Ohio,

Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Maryland,

Pennsylvania and Minnesota. Although well financed,

the League was an easy target for Farley and the
party

bosses that remained loyal to FDR. He concentrated on the
nature of partisan selfishness expressed by the League and
its attempt to set class against class. According to Farley,

"The American people resented the idea of

a

league formed by

organized wealth to further its own political interests,
regardless of what happened to other classes in the nation."
[3]

The Spring primaries which demolished the hopes of the

Liberty League created

a

more disturbing problem.

Father

Coughlin had turned his National Union for Social Justice,
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which he claimed had more than
five million members nationwide, into a political movement.
Coughlin announced the
Union would endorse congressional
candidates that espoused
its principles. In Pennsylvania
Coughlin endorsed twenty
Democrats and twelve Republicans.
Twelve of them won,
including Representative Michael J.
Stack in Philadelphia,
who was opposed by the local
Kelley machine. However, ten of
the twelve were incumbents, and
with the economy beginning
to show signs of recovery,
incumbency was a strong position
to hold for congressional races.
In Ohio, the radio priest
endorsed seventeen Democrats and fifteen
Republicans.

Fifteen of the candidates won, and the
Cleveland Democratic
machine was defeated along with two incumbents.
Coughlin
claimed similar victories in Wisconsin, Massachusetts,

Michigan and Maine. While

a

Coughlin endorsement did not

seem to guarantee victory both parties were surprised
at his

apparent ability to translate his public popularity into
votes.

[

4

]

By the summer of 1936 Coughlin had allied his National

Union for Social Justice with the remains of Huey Long's
Share Our Wealth Society,

under the leadership of the

Reverend Gerald L.K. Smith; Dr. Francis
California, the spokesman for
old age pensions;

a

E.

Townsend of

movement advocating monthly

and Congressman William Lempke,

of neopopulist plains state

spokesman

farmers. Lempke would be the
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candidate of the Union Party,
as the new organization was
called. But the real threat to
Roosevelt, if there was one,
lay in the possibility that
Coughlin could translate his
huge radio audience into a
national voting block. On June

Coughlin announced the formation of
the new party and
his support of Lempke for
President on a special nationwide
broadcast. Claiming a "new day for
America" Coughlin
19,

called

on

"agriculture, labor, the disappointed
Republicans and the
outraged Democrats" to join the new party
and help "avoid

the

treacherous pitfalls of red communism."
[5]
In

early August the followers of Dr. Townsend
convened

for their convention.

in

a

Reverend Smith spoke to the delegates

speech that was to set the tone for the upcoming

campaign. The country was faced with

a

choice "in the

presence of atheistic Communistic inf luence

.

.

.

It

is the

Russian primer or the Holy bible... the Red flag or the Stars
and Stripes ... Lenin or Lincoln ... Stalin or Jefferson." H.L.

Mencken said he had never heard
next speaker,
He

a

more effective speech. The

Father Coughlin, was not about to be upstaged.

told the crowd that FDR stood for "Franklin

Double-crossing Roosevelt,"

a

and boos from the audience.

The Sargent-at-Arms called for

arder,

charge which drew both cheers

and Dr Townsend asked that the "booers" be put out.

Coughlin resumed by asking the crowd why the American
Communist Party was supporting Roosevelt for President.
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Ripping off his Roman collar,
he called FDR
"betrayer." [6]

a

"liar" and

a

Church leaders were taken aback
by the ferocity of
Coughlin's attack on the President.
His immediate superior,
Bishop Michael Gallagher of Detroit,
was about to leave for
Rome and discussions with Pius
XI. Questioned about
Coughlin's speech, Gallagher said he
did "not approve of the
language Father Coughlin had used in
expressing himself on
the President." The bishop said he
did not believe Roosevelt
was

a

Communist and that disagreement over policy
was not

reason to call

a

man

a

a

"liar." However, Gallagher said he

could not censure Coughlin and he would not
be discussing
the priest with Vatican officials "unless
they speak of it."
[7]

The Vatican would indeed "speak of it" when
Gallagher

arrived in Rome. While Gallagher and his traveling

companion, Bishop Joseph Schrembs of Cleveland, were en
route to Rome the Vatican released

a

statement saying that

Coughlin's characterization of Roosevelt as

a

liar was

a

"painful expression." Coughlin took the opportunity to

publish an apology to the President in the form of an open
letter to FDR in his newspaper Social Justice. Coughlin said
"in the heat of civic interest

used the word

'liar.'

I

in righteous anger. ..I

now offer the President my sincerest

apology. "[8

55

On arriving in Rome
Gallagher and Schrembs denied

rumors that Gallagher had
been called to Rome specifically
to discuss Coughlin and
went so far as to defend
Coughlin's
"fight for the preservation of
American democracy." The
bishops would quickly change
their tune. After meeting with
Vatican officials, including
Monsignor Giuseppe Pizzard, the
Pope's closest political advisor,
Gallagher announced that
he "personally, would favor
Mr. Roosevelt
more than any

other candidate at present," and
that he and Schrembs "have
been advised to cease talking about
Father Coughlin." [9]

Coughlin did not appear ready to compromise.
Taking
the campaign trail in early August
he continued
to

FDR,

now referring to him as

a

to

hammer at

"scab" President leading

a

"scab army" of reliefers. Coughlin claimed
the New Deal was

"surrounded by red and pink Communists and by
'frankfurters'
of

destruction,"

a

pointed reference to Supreme Court

Justice Felix Frankfurter, appointed by Roosevelt. He became

threatening in Providence, R.I., claiming there "would be
more bullets in the White House than you could count with an

adding machine" if FDR were reelected.
he

In New Bedford,

Ma.

told an audience of 12,000 that he had been instrumental

in removing Herbert Hoover
be instrumental in taking

from the White House and "I will
a

Communist from the chair once

occupied by Washington." [10]
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Returning to Cleveland for
the national convention of
his National Union for
Sooial Justice in mid-August,
both he
and Smith returned to the
familiar theme of Roosevelt and
communism. Smith gave one off
the most dramatic speeches of
his career. The New Deal was
.14
led hv
by
a slimy
r,

group of men

culled from the pink campuses of
America with friendly gaze
fixed on Russia. ..and the had
the face to recognize Russia,
where two million Christians had
been butchered." Smith
concluded to a roar when he announced that the
election was

really meaningless to him:
the red

"My real

mission is to see that

flag of bloody Russia is not hoisted in
place of the

Stars and Stripes." [11]

Coughlin appeared angered at the enthusiastic response
given Smith's speech by his National Union members.
But his
flair for the dramatic would once again come to his rescue
in

his battle of one-upsmanship with Smith.

hot sun the

Speaking under

following day Coughlin told his followers that

both Roosevelt and Rexford Tugwell,

a

key Roosevelt advisor,

were "communistic." Referring to the campaign as

advised the National Union members "to go
to

a

a

to

a

"war" he

your homes as

trench." He then collapsed and was assisted from the

stage. He was treated for

advised to rest.

a

mild case of exhaustion and

[12]

The political threat that Coughlin and the Union Party

presented

to

FDR was beginning to take
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a

back seat to the

threat to the church presented
by his activities. The
specter of a revived an t i -C a t
ho 1 i c i s . which had dominated
Presidential politics as recently
as the 1928 campaign be an
g
to surface. A faculty
member of the Concordia Lutheran
Theological Seminary stated publicly
that "the voice behind
that radio priest is the voice
of his church." At the
same

ti-e the New Republic,

a

liberal periodical, reported that

"the Union Party marks the
deliberate entrance of the Roman

Catholic Church into national
politics," and suggested that
the Vatican was backing Coughlin
because it was depending on
the financial support of "wealthy
American Catholic
families," and that "influential and
wealthy Americans such
as Al

Smith and John

J.

Raskob,

think he can help defeat

Roosevelt." [13]
Both the Vatican and the American Catholic
hierarchy
were concerned with distancing themselves
from Coughlin and

assuring all Americans that his views were not
those of the
church. On September

2,

Osservatore Roman* criticized

priests who challenged the constituted authorities in the

countries in which they lived, and pointed out Coughlin's
attacks on the President as an example. The article also
took issue with Bishop Gallagher for stating that the

Vatican approved of Coughlin's activities. Both Coughlin and
the press were on hand when Gallagher's ship returned from

Rome. Seemingly overwhelmed by Coughlin's presence the
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bishop was quoted as sayine
/in 6

" T f
lt

'

c
s

the voice of God that

co.es to you from the great
orator fro. Royal Oak. Rally
round it." The bishop denied
the report in Osserv.t^
RomajrwLwas accurate.

Coughlin was overjoyed with this

seeming endorsement, but then was
shocked to hear Gallagher
claim that Roosevelt was the b
e s t -q ual i f i ed candidate for
the presidency. When asked about
the Osservatore editorial
Coughlin claimed it was only "one
newspaper's opinion." The
Vatican then took the unusual step of
sending a note to all
press organizations confirming that the
Osservatore

editorial represented the official Vatican
position on this
issue .[ 14
]

Just how much of

a

political threat the Union Party

represented to FDR is an open question. The President was

at

the height of his popularity despite the sniping
and

accusations of communist sympathies. Publicly, Farley
dismissed the third party movement, privately he was taking
no

chances.

He

was continually monitoring the Union Party

strength through his vast network of personal contacts,
party workers and even postal authorities. FDR had

instructed Farley to monitor postal receipts for Royal Oak
to

keep tabs on the priest's popularity. Several states were

reporting great strength among Coughlin supporters. Both the
nation's conservative and liberal press were taking the new
party seriously. The conservative Los Angeles Times
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suggested that "Lemuke'Q
f^^d „Party may defeat Roosevelt."
PKe s thlr
The liberal New Rep ublic,
editorialized "this party is far
*ore formidable than Al Smith's
Liberty League.... It might
Prove that the New Deal has not
been radical enough to
satisfy popular discontent." The
Minneapolis TrU„ na
suggested that Lempke's popularity
in the farm states would
challenge FDR's earlier vote. A New
York Ti,»c survey
revealed Townsend's popularity in
Washington, Oregon and
California would disrupt traditional
Democratic and

Republican voting patterns.

[15]

Unquestionably, Coughlin's strength rested with
Catholic voters.

Massachusetts political leaders were

virtually unanimous in their fear of Coughlin's
support.
Governor James Curley, Congressman John McCorraack
and
Senator David Walsh all reported to Farley that
Coughlin's

popularity would translate into

a

large Lempke vote. The

President's son, James Roosevelt, claimed Coughlin was
"stronger in Massachusetts than in any other state." Farley
disagreed, stating that Ohio was the strongest Coughlin
state. Reports were coming in almost daily of the threat

Coughlin forces represented in Cleveland, where Coughlin's

endorsement in the Spring primaries had been attributed

to

defeating the local machine candidate. The priest was demonstrating great influence among both German and Irish
Catholics. One party worker claimed: "I am not
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anti-Catholic, ...but g0 into any
Catholic settlement in
Northwestern Ohio and you will
Ei „d a lot of strong Le.pfce
sentiment and following." [16]
Farley was undoubtedly ready
to call in all the
political lOU's. Catholics had been
one of the groups to
benefit most from FDR's patronage.
The percentage of
Catholics appointed to the federal
judicxary increased from
four percent during the combined
administrations of Wilson,
Harding, Coolidge and Hoover to 29
percent under Roosevelt.
Many prominent Catholic politicians
were calling on the

American Church
Edward
to

J.

take

to

a

public position against Coughlin.

Flynn of the Bronx was reported to have
threatened

leave the church if the clergy did not
repudiate the

priest.

Joseph

P.

Kennedy,

Chairman of the Securities and

Exchange Commission, and Frank Murphy, Governor
of Michigan
and

a

former close friend of Coughlin,

were assigned to work

against the priest among Catholic laymen.

[17]

While Catholic politicians and laymen were busy solid-

ifying FDR's position among Catholic voters the clergy was
no

less active in making its position known.

In July,

shortly after Coughlin's opening attack on the President,
Reverend Maurice

S.

Sheehy of Catholic University wrote to

Roosevelt informing him that his "friends are not ignoring
the calumnies of Father Coughlin." Sheehy told FDR of

a

meeting he had attended in New York attended by four bishops
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"

]

and three monsignori at
which Coughlin's attacks on
the
President had been the topic
of discussion. The result
was
Plan on "how this matter might
be handled most effectively
and we have taken action."
[18]

Although Sheehy's letter to FDR
did not outline the
Plan of action discussed at New
York it soon became clear
that the Church hierarchy
intended to refute Coughlin at
every turn, and disociate his
campaign rhetoric from any
official sanction by the church. Coughlin
continued to
attack the President as a "communist"
and the New Deal as

,

a

communist-inspired program developed by the
President's
advisors. He told the public that in voting

for Roosevelt

"We

are voting for the Communists,

Russian lovers,
Before
the

a

the socialists,

the

the Mexican lovers and the Kick-me-downers

.

crowd estimated at 100,000 in Chicago he decried

"Commies" in the administration:

"Rexie Tugwell

shaker of Russia, plow-me-down Wallace,

..

.

.

.

hand

.Josephus Daniels

-

the man who applauds the slaughter of priests and nuns in

Mexico." He was raising again all the issues associated by

Catholics with communist influence in the years of the

Roosevelt administration

.[ 19

But now his remarks were not going unchallenged.

Coughlin gave
Roosevelt
use

a

a

When

speech in Cincinnati in which he declared

"dictator" and said it might become necessary to

"bullets" instead of "ballots" Archbishop McNicholas
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]

responded that he "cannot let
pass the advocacy of the use
of bullets and I condemn
such remarks." South Dakota's
Bishop Bernard Mahoney publicly
called Cou S hll„ a "Cultural
vulgarian," and Boston's Cardinal
Williaa, O'Connell
spoke

out against him.

[20]

In early October

the anti-Coughlin campaigns of
the

Catholic politicians and the Catholic
clergy converged.
Senator Joseph O'Mahoney of Wyoming
reached Monsignor John
Ryan of Catholic University with

a

request that Ryan make

a

radio speech rebutting Coughlin's
charges of communists in
Washington. Ryan agreed to make the speech
and submitted

several drafts to O'Mahoney. FDR himself seems
to have had
some input into the speech. An early draft,
with a specific

reference to Coughlin was edited to delete his
name, then it
was put back in "reportedly at the direction of
the

President [21
.

Ryan went on the air on October
to

8,

addressing himself

"the wage earners" and "toilers" who had suffered most

from the depression and benefited most from the New Deal.
This category of course contained the great bulk of working

class Catholics who had made up the great waves of

immigration concentrated in America's urban areas. Ryan
dismissed Coughlin's charges that FDR and his advisors such
as Felix Frankfurter and Rexford Tugwell

were communists.

Ryan charged that Coughlin's explanation of what was wrong
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with the American economy
* n
y were »a+
at least 50
percent wrong"
and his solutions "at least
lea^t- on
90 ~percent wrong." He concluded
by begging "the toilers of
America" notAmerica
all
,
not fton abandon
Roosevelt
in the coming election.
[22]
The Vatican now stepped into
the picture.
30

it

On September

was announced that Cardinal
Secretary of State Eugenio

Pacelli would visit the United
States for

a

three week

"vacation." The American hierarchy was
taken completely off
guard by the announcement, with the
exception of Boston's
Auxiliary Bishop Frances Spellman, who was
secretly notified
of

the visit in August.

The bishop confided to his diary his

reservations about the second most powerful prelate
in the
Vatican visiting the United States in the midst of

election in which Catholics were playing such
role. Spellman realized,
be

confined to

a

or knew,

on

a

a

heated

prominent

that this visit would not

simple "vacation." A nationwide tour for

the Cardinal was organized.

quiet days at

a

a

Pacelli spent four relatively

secluded Long Island estate before embarking

trip that took him to Boston, Cleveland, Philadelphia,

Washington, Chicago, St. Paul, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
St.

Louis, Cincinnati and back to New York. Pointedly

omitted from the Cardinal's itinerary was the Diocese of
Detroit, Father Coughlin's home base.

[23]

Bishop Gallagher was angered at the snub,
to Cincinnati

and traveled

along with his friend Bishop Schrembs of
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Cleveland seeking to meet with
Pacelli. Although the two
arrived early in the morning they
were informed that the
Cardinal was already in a meeting
with McNicholas. The two
bishops were left to cool their
heels
most of the day and

then informed the Cardinal would
not grant them an audience.
The next day, however, Gallagher
was informed by Pacelli "to
exercise more control over Father Coughlin
and to inform him
that he was not to participate in
political campaigning once
the

1936 election was over."

Gallagher seems to have

finally gotten the message. On October
30, with Pacelli
still in the country, Gallagher forced Coughlin
to make

public apology for calling Roosevelt

a

a

"scab President." He

also implied that Coughlin would no longer be allowed
to

participate in politics after the election, something which
Coughlin later confirmed.

[24]

When the votes were counted, Roosevelt won an

overwhelming victory. The President carried 46 states with
popular vote plurality of over
Union Party had not been

a

11

a

million votes. Coughlin's

factor in the outcome. The

evidence seems clear that Farley had pulled out all the
stops to keep Catholic voters from deserting FDR in favor of
the popular Coughlin and had succeeded dramatically.

Election analysts agreed that Catholics voted for Roosevelt
in huge numbers.
of

They disagreed only on the exact magnitude

the percentage that voted for FDR. George Gallop
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estimated the Catholic vote
for Roosevelt at over 70
Percent. R.M. Darrow said of
Catholics voting over 80
percent voted for FDR. [25]
In

the midst of Pacelli's
whirlwind tour of the

country Spellman noted in his
diary on October 24: "Joe
Kennedy arranged for President to
invite Cardinal to lunch
with him on November 5th and so
told me,

but

I

said to have

Cardinal invited directly and through
neither of us." The
day after the election Roosevelt met
with Cardinal Pacelli
at

his home at Hyde Park.

The guest list

for the

post-election day luncheon hosted by the President's
mother,
Sara Delano Roosevelt, was surprisingly limited;
the

President, Cardinal Pacelli, Bishop Spellman, Bishop
Stephen
J.

Donahue representing Cardinal Hayes of New York, Count

Galeazzi, Joseph

Kennedy and Mrs. Kennedy and Frank

P.

Walker and Mrs. Walker.

Spellman said such

a

In

C.

letter to his brother Bishop

a

meeting "before the Presidency of

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, would have been considered

fantastic." The President elect and the Cardinal sat before
the

fireplace and discussed

was

a

a

wide range of topics.

"This

great day for America and for Catholic America,"

Spellman concluded.

[26]

Little else is known of the events of that day, or of
what the President and the future Pope talked about in front
of

the fireplace. A crowd of reporters gathered outside the
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President's home waiting for
the Cardinal to emerge. They
speculated that the two men
discussed Communism, Father
Coughlin, and the possibility
the President would recognize
the Vatican: sending an envoy
to the Pope. Their hopes
for a
quote on any of these matters
were dashed when the Cardinal
emerged. The following day The
New m.w Tj^s
reported that

Pacelli left the meeting with FDR
and greeted the waiting
correspondents. However, attempts to
question the Cardinal
"were stopped before a single
question could be completed."
The Cardinal's escort, Bishop
Spellman, "declared that the

Cardinal had given no interview and
should give none now."
Despite efforts to convince the Cardinal
that questions he
did not want to answer would be
considered "as not having

been put" Bishop Spellman "firmly declined."
[27]
The lesson of the day was not lost on either
the press
or President Roosevelt:

Bishop Spellman carried great weight

with Cardinal Secretary of State Pacelli.

This would become

increasingly clear in future years as FDR relied on Spellman
as

a

private channel of communication to the Vatican,

circumventing normal diplomatic channels such as the
Apostolic Delegate in Washington and other, higher ranking
members of the American Catholic hierarchy.
a

It

was just such

message which Spellman sent to Pius XII outlining FDR's

postwar plans in late 1943.
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Although Roosevelt was overwhelmingly
reelected and
the Union Party crushed in
the 1936 election it
would be

mistake to view the election
results as

a

a

complete

repudiation of Coughlin. Analysts have
correctly pointed out
that the Union Party faced more
than the usual obstacles
Placed in the path of American
third-party movements. There
was never a real political
organization associated with the
Union Party: no cadres to get out
the vote, no workers to
canvass and identify potential votes.
Both Coughlin and
Smith used the party to advance their own
personal agenda
rather than attempting to foster

a

new political movement.

The party managed to get on the ballot
in only 36 states,

and in six of those states the party label
did not appear on
the ballot.

As

the campaign progressed the dissension within

the party became evident until even Dr.

Townsend recognized

the problem and switched his support to Landon.

Voters were

faced with the usual third-party dilemma, would their vote
be

wasted? All these problems contributed to the crushing

defeat suffered by the Union Party.
There is no measure to determine how much of the

public believed the charges of communist influence within
the New Deal or the accusation that FDR himself was

a

communist. But the charge hung in the air, and although

Coughlin was under orders not to become actively involved in
politics again he was not under orders to stay off the air

68

with his radi0 show. He would
continue to be a thorn in the
side of Roosevelt and his
radio program would continue to
draw huge audiences. The issue
of communis* would not go
away. And for Catholics the
issue would become more critical
very soon.
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CHAPTER

5

"...THE LOSS OF EVERY CATHOLIC
VOTE...

H

The President barely had
time to celebrate his

reelection before Catholic anti
-communism was once again
thrust into his decision-making
process. Events at home and
abroad were again beginning to
focus around the fear of the

spread of international communism,
and around charges that
FDR was fostering communism
within the U.S.
In July of

of

1936 General Francisco Franco led

a

revolt

the Spanish army against the
democratically elected

Popular Front government, which included
elements of the
Spanish Communist Party. The Popular Front
received only 46
percent of the votes cast in the Spanish elections.
However,
the proportional representation used to
allocate seats in

the Diet resulted in the Front receiving almost
two thirds
of

the seats.

The anti-Catholic sentiments of the extreme

left within the Front quickly manifested itself in

widespread incidents of anti-clericalism: churches were
burned, religious education attacked, and priests, bishops
and nuns murdered. Catholics argued that Franco's revolt

was based on the fact that the democratic elements within
the coalition had "succumbed to the extreme Leftist groups"
and was founded "on the legitimate ground that the

government had betrayed the electorate ."[1
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a

Franco's revolt was widely
viewed as the latest
n.nifeatation of European F,aci sra
challenging the rule of
democracy. Therein lay the
problem lor African Catholics.
Commonweal opened the new year with an
editorial on January
I
taking issue with Its Protestant
counterpart,
TJls.

chr i st i an Crnrury

,

which had editorialized

the Catholic Church was conducting

,

utt

in

1936 that

world-wide campaign

against Communism because "The Holy
See is really concerned
with supporting Fasci am
w
h
its inevitable accompaniments
,

of

-

1

t

autocracy and brutality, and lor the special
privileges

which the Roman Catholic Church

able to enjoy under

Is

Fascist governments.'" The editors of Commonweal

to.,nH

charge incredible, and pointed to the opinion

the editor

of

Per AnEr i ff

,

Pacelli's visit
set up

a

Joseph Goebbels,
to

the

who charged

of

that Cardinal

United States was part

"Catholic Center Party"

in

thia

o

1

a

plan to

order to prevent

spread of National Socialiat doctrine, and that FDR

the

'

reelection was "one anointed by the Vatican." The Commonweal
editors doubted both views could

be

correct.

I?

|

The Church's condemnation of Communism was not

political, according to Com monweal
propaganda,

as

in

Spain,

.

but

religious. Communist

embodied in the slogan "Join with

Communism against Fascism to save democracy" was
issue.

The real

a

false

issue was not between Communism and Fascism

but between "democracy and all
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forms of totalitarianism,

including

C, mis ,.

Fascisn

„ as

,

noth ng
.

^

^

reaction against Co,.„nis,,
uithout Hhtch it could
exist. The editorial frampH
trained fh<
the issue for American
Catholics
and would for, the basis of
the Catholic approach to
Spain
as long as the civil war
went unresolved. More importantly,
the Catholic attitude would
carry great weight
with FDR

.

[3]

Isolationist sympathies in the United
States were
Sreatly strengthened following the
revelations
of

the Nye

Committee in 1934. These hearings
produced the 1935
Neutrality Act prohibiting U.S. arms
manufacturers from
supplying belligerents in any foreign
war. FDR attempted
apply the act to the Spanish Civil War,
but

the act did not

mention civil wars, and U.S. arms manufacturers
began
make shipments to both sides.

to

to

When the administration's

efforts at moral persuasion failed FDR asked for
an

amendment to the 1937 renewal of the act that would
include
civil wars and expand executive discretion in applying
the
act.

Congress willingly approved the inclusion of civil wars

in the act.

The extension of executive powers was another

matter. [4]

FDR opened his second term with perhaps the most

serious political blunder of his years in office: his
attempt to pack the Supreme Court. Much of the congressional
debate surrounding 'the extension of executive powers sought
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by the President in
the Neutrality Act revolved
around his

attempt to assume "dictatorial
powers." Senator Hiram
Johnson, an ardent isolationist,
said Roosevelt's attempt to
alter the nature of the court
would lead to him making
himself "an absolute dictator
in fact." The court fight
spilled over into the Neutrality
Act fight over the question
of extension of executive
powers. The nature of the Spanish
fight was also changing. In
March Italian troops were
captured at Guadalajara proving the
charges that Italy and
Germany were actively supporting the Franco
"Nationalists."
C5]

As the civil

war in Spain intensified,

American

opinion on the Neutrality Act began to shift. The

Guadalajara incident shifted the argument from direct
help
to

the

Loyalist government

to

imposition of the Neutrality

Act against Italy and Germany. At the same time the
Vatican
was clarifying its position on the conflicting ideologies

involved in the struggle. In early March Pius XI issued back
to

back encyclicals. The first, Mit Brenneder Soree

.

(With

Burning Sorrow) was an open attack on German National

Socialism. The encyclical charged the Nazi government with

violating the 1933 concordat concluded between the Reich and
the

Vatican,

and with sowing "suspicion,

discord, hatred,

calumny" and "secret and open hostility to Christ and His

Church." The Pope attacked the racial and religious policies

75

of

the Third Reich and predicted
"destructive reli gl0 us
wars. ..which have no other
aim than ... extermination The
.

concordat of 1933 had been negotiated
by Eugenic Pacelli,
then serving as Papal Nuncio in
Germany. It guaranteed
freedom of the Catholic religion
and the right of the Church
"to regulate

her own affairs." The Reich broke

the concordat

within five days of its signing. Thousands
of priests and
lay leaders were arrested and confined
to concentration

camps,

church property was confiscated, Catholic

publications suppressed and the sanctity of the
confessional
was violated by the Gestapo.

The second encyclical,

[6]

Divini Redemptoris

T

attacked

"the principles of dialectical and historical
materialism"
and condemned Communism as
who
it

"intrinsically wrong, and no one

would save Christian civilization may collaborate with
in

any undertaking whatsoever." This "plague on both your

houses" attitude of the Vatican may explain why American

Catholic opinion was split on the question of Spain. With

Communists on one side and Fascists on the other, Catholics
were being

forced to choose between the lesser of two evils,

as Commonweal

however,

suggested. The American Catholic hierarchy,

had no difficulty in choosing sides.

Increasingly,

the struggle in Spain was portrayed in terms of the

Communist faction within the Loyalist coalition. While the

Catholic press was highlighting the anti -clerical atrocities
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of

the Loyalist government,

bishops throu s hout the country

were associating the government's
activities with the spread
of

international Communism .[
In

7

late April the bombing of
Guernica thrust the

entire question of the embargo
back into the spotlight. It
also exemplified the confusion
surrounding the entire raa tter
for American Catholics.

German made planes bombed the Basque

city for several hours leaving
1,654 people dead and another
889 wounded. Calls immediately went out
for an embargo
against Germany and Italy. The Basque
region was largely
Catholic, and the bombing should have outraged
Catholic

opinion in America as it did the rest of the
country. But
the Basques were fighting for the Loyalists,

which meant the

communists. German planes being used to bomb Spanish

Catholics who were fighting for the communists?

It

was

enough to confuse any Catholic. [8]
In

the meantime FDR finally worked out

a

compromise

with Senator Pittraan regarding the extension of the

Neutrality Act. The President was forced

to

accept less of

the discretionary power he first sought under the act in the

face of Pittman's objections to the expansion of

"dictatorial powers." On May

1,

the permanent Neutrality Law

went into effect. Norman Thomas met with the President in
June after returning from Spain and observing the war first
hand. When Thomas raised the issue of the war in Spain and
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the embargo the President
told hi, his position "had been
and would be guided by what
he thought was the attitude
of
the Catholic Church in America."
[9]

Was the President's position on
Spain

a

the role the Catholic hierarchy
played in the

payback for
'36

election?

Catholic public opinion was, and would
continue to be, split
on the question of what to do
about Spain. The hierarchy of
the Church, however, was virtually
unanimous.
The debate

over the civil war in Spain would continue
through the rest
of

1937 and 1938.

FDR continued to refuse to apply the

embargo to Berlin and Rome, and to lift it
against Spain. He
did this in spite of polls indicating the
overwhelming

support such

a

move would have with the American people. A

Gallop Poll conducted in December of 1938 asked: "Which side
do you sympathize with in the Spanish Civil War?"

Nationally,
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percent sympathized with the Loyalists, while

only 24 percent sympathized with Franco. When broken down by

religion, however, only 42 percent of Catholics sided with
the Loyalists,
was

compared to 83 percent of Protestants. Franco

favored by 58 percent of Catholics compared to only 17

percent of Pro test ants
For FDR,

.[ 10

however,

the issue was

framed in terms of the

opposition of the Catholic hierarchy. Clearly, Catholic lay
opinion on Spain was divided, as the poll indicated. As the

congressional elections in the fall of 1938 approached, FDR
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Put the matter in purely valHtH-.i *
y poiltlcal terms. Secretary
of the
Interior Harold Ickes was
furious when Roosevelt failed
to
act on lifting the embargo
against Spain. He recounts in his
diary how he overcame FDR's
logistical objections to lifting
the arms ban only to have
the President relate that he
had

discussed the matter that morning
with congressional leaders
and they feared that to raise
the ban "would
mean the loss

every Catholic vote in the coming
fall elections." The
Interior Secretary exclaimed in his
diary "This proves up to
the hilt what so many people have
been saying,
of

namely,

that

the Catholic minorities in Great
Britain and America have

been dictating the international policy
with respect to

Spain." [11]
Clearly,

FDR's position was political,

President's would be.

It

was also consistent,

as

as

any
the

two

conversations with Thomas and Ickes demonstrate. The thrust
of

both conversations,

coming over

a

year apart,

indicate

that the President was unwilling to risk losing the Catholic
vote over the issue of Spain.

They also demonstrate that his

fear was that the Catholic hierarchy's strong anti-communist

position on Spain was the deciding factor. The ability of
the hierarchy to offset Coughlin's influence in the

election was

a

'36

lesson not lost in the White House. Some

historians argue that recollections of private conversations
with FDR cannot be taken at face value because he had
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a

tendency to tell people what
they wanted to hoar, and then
dtd what he wanted. Clearly,
what FDR waa telling both
Tho.as and Ickea waa not what
they wanted
to

he

he

did was not what they wanted
hi* to do,

hear,

and what

but rather what

felt he needed to do.
*****

While the controversy over lifting
the arms embargo
against Spain was raging the question
of communist influence
within the administration would not
go away. Father Coughlin
briefly left the air following the 1936
election, as he said
he

would if the Union Party was not victorious,

but quickly

resumed his broadcasts and supervision of
his Social J„ S Hr,

newspaper. By July of 1937 Coughlin was again
on the attack
against communists,

this time within the Congress of

Industrial Organizations. He labeled the entire CIO as

a

"Moscow tool teeming with communists" and charged they were
taking instructions from the "Communist Central Committee of
the United States." Earlier,

Coughlin labeled CIO head John

L.

Lewis

to

prepare the way for the eventual victory of Marxism in

a

"labor dictator" and "a communist tool being used

the United States."

[12]

With Coughlin back in stride questions began to

surface in places generally considered more congenial to the
President. Writing in Commonweal in September Oliver McKee,
Jr.

denounced the "class prejudice" being fostered by the
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New Deal. McKee argued that
FDR

many of his policies ha ve

Prejudice,

...

*

s

"political strategy and

tended to incite class

and create in the public
mind the impression that

Property is necessarily the foe
of human rights." McKee does
not charge that FDR is a
communist, or even being influenced
by communists, but the
suggestion that
the New Deal is

promoting class warfare and "appeals
to class consciousness
to win popular support"
demonstrate that
even the liberal

Commonweal
Deal.

was beginning to question the
aims of the New

[13]
In early

1938 Coughlin was again attracting

considerable attention, so much so that the
Gallop Poll
conducted a survey in an attempt to gauge his
strength. The
poll revealed that some 8.5 million American
families
with

radios listened to Coughlin either regularly or
"from time
to

time." This represented one-third of the 24 million

households with radios. More importantly, 83 percent of
those listening to Coughlin "approved" of what he said.
The

survey was crude by today's standards, and did not break
down the audience by religion, income, region or other

indicators of where Coughlin's message was having an effect.
[14]

Clearly,

large numbers of Americans were still

listening to Coughlin and agreeing with what he was saying.
At

the time of the poll Coughlin's attacks on FDR and the
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New Deal

„ ere

beco.n, increasingly vitriolic.

October of

In

1937 Coughlin commented on the
"personal stupidity of

President Roosevelt" in an interview
while on the same day
an article in his S^cial^ustic^
d e c I a r e d that Catholics
could not belong to the CIO because
"Catholicism
was as

incompatible with the CIO as Catholicism
was incompatible
with Mohammedanism." He now added
a new aspect
to

on international communism,

his attack

associating it with

"internationl Jewry." The pages of Social .!„H rP
became
filled with anti-Semitic articles and
pro-German sentiments
Placing him in direct opposition to the anti-Nazi
position
asserted by Pius XI in his encyclical "Mit Brennenrier
Soree"

.

[15]

The communist threat was everywhere according to

Coughlin:

in

labor unions,

The political atmosphere,

colleges,

and

the

administration.

poisoned by Coughlin and others,

which continued to surround the inability of the New Deal to

bring the depression to an end manifested itself in the

summer of 1938. The House voted 181 to 41 for the creation
of

the House UnAmerican Activities Committee.

the committee

was chartered

to

Ostensibly,

investigate extremist

political activity on both the left and right. However,
under the chairmanship of Martin Dies of Texas,

the

committee focused almost exclusively on the question of
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communist inf iltrflti
nn
itration

government

f

or g ani2 ed

labor,

education and

.

The committee issued its
first report in January 1939,

defining UnAmericanism and Communism.
Citing the "Trojan
Horse" tactics of Communism, the
report suggested communists
infiltrated existing organizations or
set up "front

organizations" dedicated

to

popular causes,

but in reality

under the direction of Moscow.
Witnesses identified 640
organizations, 483 newspapers and 280
labor unions which
they said were communistic, including
the Boy Scouts, Camp
Fire Girls and several Catholic
organizations. At least one
member of the committee branded the New
Deal itself as

communist. Representative

J.

Parnell Thomas,

a

Republican

member of the committee claimed the New Deal
was "working
hand in glove with the Communist Party" and
that it was

"either for the Communist Party, or is playing into the
hands of the Communist Party." [16]
One of

the

"experts" on communism called to testify

before the Dies Committee was Father Charles Coughlin. In
his ongoing battle with the CIO he released to the committee
a

copy of remarks made to him in

Homer Martin,

a

private conversation with

former head of the United Auto Workers, in

which Martin claimed most of the leadership of the union
were communists. When Martin was forced to acknowledge the

comments in public it made the split within the UAW
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irreversible, provides Coughlin
Hit h
over the CIO. [17]
The fact that

a

sense of victory

standing committee of the congress
was
leveling the same charges as
Coughlin, and providing
a

him

with yet another forum for his
attacks,

could do nothing but

lend credence to his charges.
The criticism leveled at the
tactics of the committee, and the
ridicule of some of the

testimony by the press, was not keeping
the public from
being impacted. A poll conducted in
November of 1938 showed
that 60 percent of the respondents had
heard of the

committee, and 74 percent of those familiar with
the

committee felt its findings were "important enough

to

justify continuing the investigation." A year
later,

a

similar poll found support for continued funding of
the

committee at
As

75

percent.

[18]

FDR approached the midpoint of his second term he

found himself embroiled once again in charges that he was

a

communist or under the influence of communists within the
New Deal. He openly admitted to both Harold Ickes and Norman

Thomas that his policy on Spain revolved around the position
of the Catholic hierarchy,

which was based on the now

official anti-communism of the church, and the need to keep

Catholic voters in the Democratic Party. A resurgent Father

Coughlin was continuing his attack on the New Deal and the
President. Conditions in Europe were rolling toward war and
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speculation was beginning to
,ount that the President would
seek an unprecedented third
tar,. Having

seen the effort FDR

*ade to keep the "Catholic
Vote" in the

'36

election, and

his position on Spain designed
to keep it in the

elections it see B s clear that

a

'38

.idtera

pattern is developing in the

President's political relations with
American Catholics,
centering6 around
una the
j
une issue
i<;<5iiP of
* e
anti-communism
and leading
Teheran and Yalta.
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CHAPTER

6

PAPA ANGELICUS

Events in Europe were rapidly
deteriorating in early
1939 when Pope Pius XI died on
February 10. While the
college of Cardinals began to
assemble in Rome to choose a
successor, Hitler was pressing
the government
of

what

remained of Czechoslovakia. The
Munich agreement, which had
"guaranteed peace in our time" was falling
apart under the

onslaught of Nazi demands.
On March 2,

the traditional puffs of white smoke
arose

from the Vatican announcing to the world
the selection of

a

new Pope. Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli had been
elected and

chosen the name Pius XII. The former Papal
Secretary of
State who sat by the fire with FDR at Hyde Park
after his

reelection in L936 was now the leader of worldwide
Catholicism. The election of

a

new Pope whose career within

the church centered on Germany and diplomacy was widely

regarded as

seeking

a

a

signal the church planned on playing

a

role in

peaceful solution to the problems in Europe. The

election also initiated

a

series of events which would alter

the relationship between FDR and American Catholics.
The new Pope was immediately faced with

a

crucial

decision concerning the American church left by the sudden
death of his predecessor. The most powerful position in the
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African hierarchy

had been vacant since the
death the

Previous September of Cardinal
Hayes of the archdiocese o£
New York. Speculation on a
successor to Hayes centered on

Archbishop Edward Mooney of
Detroit and Archbishop John
McNicholas of Cincinnati, both
longtime friends of FDR.
However, barely a month after
being named Pope, Pacelli
turned to his old friend the
Auxiliary Bishop of Boston,
naming Francis

J.

Spellman the new Archbishop of New
York.

Under Spellman's tutelage the
chancery office of the
archdiocese would come to be known as the
"Powerhouse" by
political leaders of both parties and all
religious

denominations

.

With the deteriorating European political
situation
the new Pope needed as many friends in
high places as he

could find. By the end of March Czechoslovakia
disappeared
from the map of Europe,

absorbed by Germany, Poland and

Hungary. Hitler was now turning his attention to Poland.
The

attitude of the new Pope toward the Third Reich was of great

interest to the Fuehrer. Pacelli served as Papal Nuncio in

Germany from 1917

to

1929,

and negotiated the concordat

between the Reich and Vatican in 1933. There were some 35

million Catholics in Germany (including Hitler who was

a

nominal Catholic), and they, along with the Socialists, had

provided the main support of the Weimer Republic. Hitler
despised the political nature of the German church, and
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immediately outlawed the Catholic
Party upon taking office.
In spite of the concordat
confessional schools can,e under
attack, along with Catholic
Action Leagues, Catholic labor
unions and the Vatican
<-xuan itseu
iUpif as
a ~
a non-German foreign
influence
[ 1 ]
.

While Hitler was completing the
destruction of Czechoslovakia the German Foreign Office
was completing an

analysis of the new Pope. The memorandum
on Pacelli stated
"His advocacy of an orthodox church
policy repeatedly
brought him into conflict with National
Socialism on matters
of principle." The Foreign Office
regarded Pacelli
as

"Germanophile" as

a

a

result of his long tenure in Germany. He

admired German culture, philosophy, music and
literature.
The report also drew attention to the

fact the new Pope

seemed particularly affected by the appellation "Papa

Angelicus" associated with his reign. The term referred to
the prophecy of St.

Pope

a

Malachy which attributed to the 106th

revival of Apostolic simplicity and zeal which would

inaugurate

a

new age.

[2]

While Hitler continued his pressure on Poland his Axis

partner Mussolini took the opportunity to invade Albania in
early April. This move solidified the resolve of Great

Britain and France as both countries guaranteed the borders
of

neighboring Greece and Yugoslavia. FDR meanwhile sent

letter to Hitler on April

L5

a

listing 31 countries and asking
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the Fuehrer "to give
assurances that your ar.d forces
will
not attack or invade the
territory" of any of the m The
.

President sought the support
of the Vatican to his peace
initiative. Undersecretariat
of State Sumner Welles
approached the Apostolic Delegate
Ameleto Cicognani through
Monsignor Ready of the National
Catholic Welfare Conference.
The Vatican already had been
approached by both Britain and
France to support the proposal.
The Vatican,
however,

took

the position that the President's
letter reflected an

unneutral attitude, would be rejected
out of hand by the
Axis leaders and that a Vatican
endorsement would reduce the
Pope's influence in Germany. [3]

Hitler's response to FDR's peace proposal indeed took
the

form of the total rejection the Vatican predicted. The

Fuehrer publicly rebuked the President before the Reichstag
on April 28.

William Shirer called Hitler's speech that day

"the most brilliant oration he ever gave," and that "for

sheer eloquence, craftiness,
it

reached

a

irony,

sarcasm and hypocrisy,

new level that he was never to approach again."

[4]

The Fuehrer's rejection of FDR's proposal did not

deter the Pope from putting forth his own peace plan in

early May. The Pope's plan was given to the Fuehrer by the

Apostolic Nuncio in Berlin, Cesare Orsenigo. According

to

the German report of the meeting the Nuncio told Hitler of
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the Pope's concern about
the tension in Europe,

and his

desire to do all in his power
to prevent the outbreak
of
war. He suggested a conference
of the five great powers
of
Europe to discuss the Ge r nan -Po
1 i s h
and Franco-Italian

Problem before they
the danger of

got out of hand.

Hitler responded that

war was exaggerated by propaganda,

event he would have to discuss such

a

and in any

proposal with

Mussolini first. He concluded by saying
he would "In
short time. ..let the Pope have his
answer." [5]
The

a

very

five great powers of Europe included
in Pius'

were Britain,

France, Poland,

plan

Germany and Italy. The British

Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, in

a

conversation with the

Apostolic Delegate in Britain, expressed regret
that the
Russians were not invited

to

attend the conference,

and was

told "that in no circumstances would it be possible
for the
Pope to consider such an approach." His predecessors

encyclical effectively banned any cooperation with the
Soviet Union. This official Catholic anti-communism would
become an increasingly difficult problem for FDR and

American Catholics to deal with in coming months.

[6]

However, despite Halifax's admonitions the British
,

were in something of
to

a

quandary themselves at that moment as

what role the Soviets were to play in the European

situation. Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov approached both
the British and French in April with the possibility of

92

forming an alliance of the
De tIlre
thr PPe governments to
protect all
the nations of central
=^^4.
cral ^nH
and eastern
Europe which felt
threatened by Germany. When the
British government had act
accepted the proposal by early
May Winston Churchill was
openly critical stating "there
is no Beans of »aintaining an
eastern front against Nazi
aggression without the active aid
of Russia." [7]
On May 17 Berlin Nuncio
Orsenigo was finally given

Hitler's response to the Pope's
peace initiative Foreign
Minister von Ribbentrop told the Nuncio
that while Hitler
and Mussolini were "very grateful
to the Holy Father for his
.

benevolent intervention on behalf of universal
peace. ..they
think the moment is not yet ripe for a
conference" to
discuss the outstanding issues between the
various nations.
The Nuncio reported that when questioned
on the current

international situation Ribbentrop replied that "Poland, if
she judges badly enough to provoke

a

war,

will be crushed in

less time than it takes to say it." He also offered that

Germany was not afraid of war with France and England which
would not be able to penetrate Germany's defense in the west

except at

a

cost of

a

million men. More importantly,

Ribbentrop raised the prospect of Germany reaching an
agreement with Russia. Noting Stalin's displeasure over the

British and French position and the dismissal of Litvinov he
said "We have no quarrel with Russia except about
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Bolshevism
propaganda

in other words „e do
not want its perfidio us
for a world revoiution
.

.

.

but should Russia drop

this propaganda nothing
prevents us from drawing closer
together." [8]

While the Pope "in no circumstances"
would approach
the Soviet Union, and the
British were putting off
responding to Soviet overtures for
an alliance against
Germany, the German Foreign Minister
was acknowledging to
Vatican official the prospect of a
German-Russian

a

accommodation. The prospect of an alliance
between Hitler
and Stalin must have seemed so remote
as to border on the
preposterous. There is no indication in the Vatican

documents that this information was passed on to
any other
European embassy.
FDR meanwhile reopened the prospect of establishing

some type of permanent diplomatic relationship with the

Vatican. Sumner Welles had been meeting regularly with the

Apostolic Delegate

to

Washington, Ameleto Cicognani, and

Msg. Ready of the National Catholic Welfare Council. Welles
was expressing the continued desire of the President to

convene

a

conference aimed at resolving the European

situation, and that the "United States government was

prepared to take part in

a

conference of nations to adjust

the present causes of world unrest." FDR seems to have been

disturbed by the exclusion of the U.S. from the Pope's
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original proposal for
a

a

peace C0nferenc6)

and

_

firm wish to be included
in any future plans.
In August,

FDR asked Welles'

indicating

[9]

opinion on the

advisability of establishing
diplomatic relations with the
Vatican. Welles responded that
the Vatican had access to
valuable sources of information
"particularly with regard to
what is actually going on in
Germany,
the U.S.

did not possess,

Italy and Spain" which

and the ability to get that

information "was of considerable importance."
The U.S. had
maintained official diplomatic relations
with the Vatican

prior to 1867,

President and
the mission.

when congress reacted against an
unpopular
more unpopular Pope by cutting off funds
for

a

The subsequent loss of the Papal States
removed

the justification for maintaining relations
with the Vatican
as

a

foreign state,

but the Lateran Treaty had returned that

status to the Vatican. Speculation that FDR intended

to

reestablish diplomatic relations with the Vatican had been
high at the time of Pacelli's visit to the U.S.

in

1936,

and

indeed FDR discussed the possibility with Archbishop
Spellraan several
In October,

times over the next two years.

[10]

after the outbreak of war, the President

again raised the issue with Spellman saying that "he was

looking for

a

moment and occasion suitable for

a

persuasive

appeal to the American people." Spellman said that the

present situation in which both the Vatican and the U.S.
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were working for the similar
aim of restoring peace seemed
"favorable and propitious."
When Spellman raised the

possibility that such an action
would undoubtedly raise
criticism the President agreed,
but added "I think

that

every moment brings us nearer
to the conclusion of this
matter." The President obviously
had a plan, which he then
outlined to Spellman. He projected
that the congress
would

adjourn sometime in November after
taking up the revision of
the Neutrality Act, and would not
return until January 3. He
felt an announcement during that
time would be appropriate
and that it could be justified by his
belief that "such an

association would be of great help to the peace
of the
world,

as

in effect it is." He also suggested the
mission

could be viewed in terms of assistance to the
refugee

problem.

[11]

That the President had already made up his mind seems

clear.

He

then discussed the question of funding such

mission, and proposed that it be considered

a

a

"special

mission of the United States Government to Rome accredited
to

the Holy See" because special missions did not require an

Act of Congress for funding,

"but once the mission has been

launched, if everything goes well, Congress could be induced
more easily to vote the funds for

a

permanent mission." FDR

had already narrowed the field of candidates to head the

mission to Myron Taylor and former Ambassador to Italy

96

Breckenridge Long. Spelean
said either .an would "be
suitable" because the Pope
already knew Taylor and Long
had
substantial diplomatic experience.
[12]

the President had not
already decided on Myron
Taylor to head the mission
to the Vatican at the time
of his
-eting with Spellman he soon did.
Taylor was almost the
If

Perfect candidate for the job.
A Protestant, Episcopalian
with Quaker ancestors, he would
not be accused
of

being

pro-Catholic. He could also not be
accused of being a wildeyed New Deal social reformer.
Formerly Chairman of the
Board of United States Steel, he
still sat on the Board of
Directors. He was also

a

Director of American Telephone and

Telegraph and The First National Bank of
New York. In
addition he had his own villa in Florence
and could take
care of his own expenses if need be until
government funds
were provided

.

While FDR was working out the details of this
mission
to

the Vatican the war in Europe seemed to come to
an end as

abruptly as it started. The Nazi Blitzkrieg overwhelmed
Poland just as Ribbentrop told Orsenigo back in May. The
lull in the war was now being dubbed Sitzkrieg

.

or the

sit-down war, by the western press. Hitler was making
overtures to the British that the war need not continue. The
Foreign Office was taken completely by surprise by the
Pope's latest effort to secure
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a

peaceful settlement to the

^

conflict. Sir D'Arcy Osborne,
British Ambas£ador to
Vatican, informed the Forei
s „ office in late November
that
Pius had been approached
f ^
B »*
FKioacnea to
act
as an intermediary for a
discontented group within the
German Abwehr ied by Coionel
Hans Oster. This group contacted
Monsignor Ludwig Kaas,
former leader of the German
Centre Party living tn eitile in
Rome with a proposal for a
military coup against Hitler
involving members of the General
Staff. The conspirators
sought the Pope's guarantee
dniee that
6
tnat -if
if the coup were successful
the British would negotiate a
peace based on the restoration
of Poland and non-German
Czechoslovakia, but leaving Austria
as part of Germany. In other
words post Munich Germany would
remain intact, but without a Nazi
government. [13]
Notes went back and forth between Halifax,
Chamberlain
and Osborne.

French,
as

The Foreign Office wanted to bring in the

but the Pope wanted

limited

a

to

keep knowledge of the plan to

number of people as possible, and was convinced

the French would go along if the British agreed.

The

negotiations dragged on until March with the Foreign Office
apparently vacillating between taking the matter seriously,
and then raising doubts about the nature of the conspiracy.

Osborne's diary relates his frustration with the long
process of communicating questions from Halifax and

Chamberlain to the Germans through the Pope and then their
response. The Germans in turn were attempting to find out
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c

»ho would be

accepu.u

to

the BritJsh

^

,

Sovernnent. The whole thl»
s collapsed as the Generals
involved, including Berk
a «w
u nJ
GCk and
8
"alder,
put off acting as final
Preparations for the
ne b
Snrino
c
P r mg „
offensive
in the west drew
nearer. [14]
Meanwhile, on December 24,
FDR announced he was
sending Myron Taylor to Rome
as his "personal representative
to the Pope." The President
was still clearly worried about
reaction to his announcement. He
sent a letter to Pius
informing him of Taylor's appointment,
and a similar letter
to Dr. Charles A. Buttrick,
President of the Federal Council
of Churches of Christ in
America, and to Rabbi Cyrus Adler,
President of the Jewish Theological
Seminary of America. The
President couched his appointment of
Taylor in spiritual
terms,

seeking the Pope's opinion on matters of
peace and

guidance in these troubling times. He also
asked Buttrick
and Adler to do

the same.

The difference,

however,

was

substantial, as pointed out by Cicognani: "the President
is
sending

a

Representative

to

the Holy See,

above mentioned gentlemen he is extending

while to the two
a

simple

invitation to call on him." [15]
The American Protestant community also noted the

difference. Buttrick's organization called for Taylor's

immediate recall. Protestant groups throughout the country

condemned the appointment, some in open anti-Catholic
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hostility, others calling on
the tradition of the separation
of church and state. Dr.
George Truett, President of the
Baptist World Alliance said the
Pope "has in fact no better
title to receive governmental
recognition from the United
States than. ..the head of the least
of the Baptist
associations in the hills of North
Carolina." FDR weathered
the criticism, cracking jokes
at a press conference about
Just what an ambassador to the Vatican
would do each day.
The strategy he outlined to Spellman
worked, however, and

congress raised little objection
it returned.

[16]
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to

the Taylor mission when

.

.
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CHAPTER

7

"NOW COMES THIS RUSSIAN
DIVERSION"

By late spring 1941 FDR
was faced with the prospect of

yet another foreign policy
decision which hinged on

overcoming American hostility to
communism, and in
particular American Catholic ant i
-communism Virtually all
intelligence information was pointing to
.

the

Hitler intended

to

invade the Soviet Union.

fact that

This information

was given to Soviet Ambassador
Constantin Oumansky by Under

Secretary of State Sumner Welles in early
March. Welles
later commented that Oumansky "turned very
white" upon

hearing the news, but in Welles' judgment Oumansky
was

poorly informed by Moscow on German/Soviet relations,
and he
doubted Oumansky ever passed the information on to
Moscow. [1]
On June 22,

the rumors turned into reality as the

Wehrmacht drove into Russian territory along

a

thousand mile

front extending from the Baltics to the Balkans. Churchill
had his eastern front at last,

and immediately announced

that Britain would "give whatever help we can to Russia and
the Russian people." The President and the State Department

waited

a

full day before making an announcement.

Historian

Walter LaFeber described the statement released by the State

Department on June 23 as "less than enthusiastic; for
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example it criticized the
Soviets for not allowing full
freedom of religion." This is
something of an

understatement. The text stated "that
freedom to worship God
as their consciences dictate
is the great and fundamental
right of all people." This right
was "denied to
their

peoples by both the Nazi and Soviet
Governments." The
"communistic dictatorship" of the Soviet
Union was as

"intolerable and as alien"

to

the people of the United

States as the "Nazi dictatorship."
[2]
The key to FDR's thinking at this
crucial juncture of
the world crises is contained in his
only modification to
the statement prepared by the State

Department. The final

sentence was added at the President's instruction:
"Hitler's
armies are today the chief dangers of the Americas."
The

President approved the stress on religious freedom contained
in the State

Department draft and highlighted the greater

threat presented by Hitler's Germany for two reasons. He was
not yet convinced that Soviet military capability would

permit them to hold out very long against the Germans, and
he
a

knew that offering assistance to the Soviets would raise

firestorm of religious-based criticism, particularly among

American Catholics. Three days after the statement was
released the President wrote to Admiral Leahy.
this Russian diversion," he said,

"Now comes

"If it is more than just

that it will mean the liberation of Europe from Nazi
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]

worry about any possibility
of Russian domination ..."[
3
The American Catholic
community was as divided as the
rest of the country concerning
the great isolationist vs.
interventionist debate. But even
Catholic interventionists
would have difficulty overcoming
the moral question of aid
to the Soviet Union in
light of Pius XI's outright
condemnation of atheistic communism
and prohibition against
working with communism "in any
undertaking whatsoever." The
immediate problem was compounded by
Hitler's assertion that
his attack on Russia was

a

"crusade" against godless

bolshevism. Most observers believed this
was an open attempt
to gain the support of the Vatican
for the German war
effort. Both sides of the issue were quickly
addressed by

members of the American hierarchy.
Bishop Joseph
on July

6

Hurley of St. Augustine gave

P.

in which he attacked those he called

sympathizers over here" who were attempting
conflict in Europe as
was not

a

a

speech

"Nazi

cast the new

"holy crusade against communism." It

crusade, Hurley said, and "its standard is not the

cross but the swastika which
of

to

a

a

great Pontiff called the foe

the Cross of Christ." Hurley,

who spent 12 years in the

Vatican Secretariat of State prior to being assigned to St.
Augustine, concluded by calling Nazism the number one enemy
of America and the world.

[4]
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Francis J.L. Beckman, Archbishop
of Dubuque, spok e out
for the isolationist
wing warning that
COffllani81

—

"co^unisB,

ism Cis] everywhere gaining
ground," and
asking how one could "account
for the coddling of Communist
agents and dupes in every
responsible branch of our
'

government." Beckman charged that
Britain had allied herself
with a devil and was not
fighting "the
Battle of

Christianity." The pages of Father
Coughlin's Social Ju^icg
were filed with anti-British and
anti-communist statements
since the outbreak of the war in 1939.
With the German

invasion of Russia the newspaper congratulated
Churchill for
enabling "Stalin to dagger Hitler in the back."
[5]

By August FDR was so concerned about
Catholic reaction
he

had Myron Taylor meet with Archbishop Mooney
and Msgr.

Ready of the National Catholic Welfare Conference.
Both men

expressed concern "that the announced policy of aid

Russia creates

a

to

delicate situation in the United States."

They were concerned with the activities of the America First

Committee "and their willingness to exploit to the full

every possible source of support." The Catholic groups

associated with America First were utilizing Pius XI's
statement on atheistic communism while ignoring his equally
strong condemnation of Nazism. A possible crack in the

statement was argued in the context that it "refers

to

the

domestic rather than the international field." This argument

105

was already under attack,

Principle and failure

to

nowever,
however

accept

a

as

a

compromise in

clear pronouncement of

Papal authority." Both men
feared that "any academic or
unofficial interpretation of the
Papal statement" would
"create a definite and disastrous
cleavage in Catholic
ranks, both clerical and lay."
The only way out of the

dilemma would be "some word or
gesture on the part of the
Holy Father himself" that would
clearly indicate the

possibility of cooperation with communism
on an
international level. [6]
In

early September America First began

a

national

campaign to draw attention to the papal
encyclical. Letters
went out to all local chapters, newspaper
ads were prepared

showing the persecution of the church in
Russia and the
national headquarters agreed to finance

a

national poll of

Catholic clergy to assess opinion on the administrations

policies toward the Soviet Union. FDR, however, was ready to
act on the advise of Mooney and Ready and seek

a

clarification from the Pope on the exact meaning of Divini
Redemptoris

.

The personal relationship established with

Pacelli in 1936, and the diplomatic connection established
in

1939,

was about to pay

a

dividend in domestic politics.

The President sent Myron Taylor back to Rome carrying

personal letter to Pius.

[7]
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a

By the time FDR wrote
to the Pope he had received
the

optimistic report from Harry
Hopkins that Stalin was indeed
prepared to continue the fight
against Hitler in spite of
the continued Russian
reverses.

The Russians were putting up

stiffer resistance than either
the British or American
military projected, but the opinion
still prevailed that
they would not last long,
in spite of what Hopkins reported.
The letter Taylor earned to
the Pope explained that he was
prepared to "discuss with Your Holiness
certain matters with
regard to which I am very desirous that
he explain my
a

feelings and American opinion." The first
matter on the
agenda was the "attitude of the Russian
Government and the

Russian people toward religion." The President
said he
believed there was "a real possibility that Russia
may as

a

result of the present conflict recognize freedom of religion
in Russia." This recognition would of course exclude

the

possibility of intervention in educational or political
affairs. This would also mean religion in Russia would be
"on

a

much better footing than religious freedom is in

Germany today." [8]
The President said Russia was "governed by

a

dictatorship as rigid in its manner of being as the
dictatorship in Germany," but the "Russian dictatorship is
less dangerous to the safety of other nations" than the

German model. Propaganda was the biggest threat presented by
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the Soviets,

which the Germans used also,

but had

"undertaken the employment of every
form of military
aggression outside of its borders
for the purpose of world
conquest by force of arms." He
went on to say the survival
of Russia was less dangerous
to religion, to the church
and
to the world in general
than the survival of Germany. He
concluded by saying Taylor would
explain his feelings "in
order that Your Holiness nay understand
my position in this
respect." [9]
The official Vatican response clearly
indicates the

Pope and Cardinal Maglione did not share
the President's

belief that Russian Communism constituted

a

lesser threat

than Nazism. The elimination of both would
clearly result in
a

"period of tranquility for Europe," but if one of
these

evils remained an active force Europe would soon find
itself
in

the same situation it now faced.

If

communism triumphed

there would be no resistance to its spreading to "the

Germanic peoples, the Slav races and finally among the
Latins." The Vatican pointed
Esthonia, Finland,

Latvia,

to

the

invasion of "Poland,

Lithuania and Bessarabia" as

evidence that Russian Communism was as militaristic and

aggressive as Nazi Germany. Finally, the Russian resistance
so

far in the Russo-German war was ample evidence of the

"immense war preparations which Communism has made." [10]
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spite of all the objections
the Pope realized the
Political problem the Present
faced. Taylor must have
conveyed the President's
belief, still prevalent in
his
Military advisors, that
Russxan militarism simply was
not
the same thing as German
militarism. Taylor must have also
conveyed the sentiments of
Mooney and Ready on the need for
some clarification from the
Pope on Divini R^de^toris
In
In

an allocution delivered in
late September the Pope,

while

confirming the Church's condemnation
of Communism, made a
distinction between the communist
government of Russia and
his "paternal affection" for the
Russian
people.

Taylor was

informed of the Pope's speech, and
the Apostolic Delegate in
Washington was informed of the "elaboration
of the meaning
o f Divini Redemptnri
[11]
,

FDR had once again managed to reach an
accommodation

with the Catholic hierarchy in support of
his policies.

Archbishop McNicholas of Cincinnati sent

a

letter to all the

priests and laity of his diocese stating the "clear

distinction that Pope Pius made between the system of
atheistic communism, which he condemned, and the Russian
people, whom he loved, we shall be able to rid ourselves of
much perplexity regarding the Russian situation." The

reaction was much the same throughout Catholic America, with
the exception of Father Coughlin who continued to vilify the
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President and promote

vicious pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic
position in Social .Tncf^.
[12]
On December

7

a

the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor

brought the United States
into the war. On December 6 the
Russians began a counterattack
along a 350 mile front,

inflicting the first severe setback
to the Wehrnacht since
the war began.

The Russian front was going to
be more than

just the "diversion" FDR hoped
for in June.

When Myron

Taylor returned to Rome the following
September he was no
longer trying to assure the Pope the
Soviets
would not

dominate Europe after the war, he was telling
him they would
get what they wanted,

and it was necessary to

work with them.
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a

way to
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8

"THE DEVIL IS A COMMUNIST"

The evening before the
final session of the Teheran

Conference FDR dined with Churchill
and Stalin. When dinner
was over the President excused
himself fro* after-dinner
coffee and cigars claiming he was
not feeling well.
Churchill, Eden, Stalin and Molotov
engaged in general
conversation which eventually turned to
the question of
Poland. According to Eden the discussion
went favorably with

I

both sides believing the sooner the
issue could be resolved
the better.
are

The problem lay in the fact that the
"Americans

terrified of the subject which Harry [Hopkins]
called

'political dynamite'

for their elections."

Eden told Hopkins

the situation would only get worse the longer
it was left

unresolved and that in six months, with Russian armies in
Poland,

the elections would be

that much closer. [L]

The conversation turned to generalities about the

progress of the war during which Churchill remarked that he
believed God was on the side of the allies. Stalin grinned
when he heard the translation of the Prime Minister's

remark, and interjected that the devil was on his side
"Because, of course, everyone knows that the devil is

Communist, and God, no doubt, is

a

good conservative." Over

coffee and cigars on the final evening of the Teheran
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Conference the stumbling blocks
of the postwar peace were
outlined: Poland, religion
and the American election.
[2]
The President returned
from Teheran in time to present

his annual Christmas message
to the American people from
his
home in Hyde Parle. He told
the nation that he had gotten
along fine with Marshal Stalin
and believed in the future
"we are going to get along
very well with him and the

Russian people-very well indeed."
As events unfolded in
early 1944 the public optimism the
President expressed in
his Christmas message began to
give way to the hard

political reality of dealing with Stalin's
demands.

[3]

The stalemate which existed in Soviet/Polish
relations

since the previous April took on new significance
on January
4

when Soviet forces entered Poland. Now that
Soviet troops

were returning to eastern Poland the London Poles
were

anxious to resume relations, and establish

a

basis for

cooperation between the advancing Red Army and the
Underground Home Army.

In

Washington, Jan Ciechano wski

,

the

Polish Ambassador of the government-in-exile, was told by

Secretary of State Cordell Hull that in his opinion "the
British Government, as an ally of both Poland and of Russia,
was in

a

better position to initiate appropriate steps than

the American Government" in terms of mediating

a

reconciliation between the Soviets and the
government-in-exile. Hull was conveying to the London Poles
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the same message FDR had
give n to Stalin at Teheran:
he
could not take a public stand
on the Polish issue. Averell

Harris

later su„ed up the President's
thinking at this
Point, "The 1944 election was
fast approaching and he
Preferred to postpone the Polish
outcry until after the
votes were counted, leaving
Churchill to take the lead meanwhile." Britain's formal treaty
obligations the British had
with both Poland and Russia
provided FDR with an excuse to
avoid taking a public position on
Poland.
[4]

soon became evident that Hull had
not delivered the
position to the Poles too soon. The offer
of the London
It

U.S.

Poles to resume relations with the Soviets
and coordinate

activities between the Red Army and the Home
Army was
tersely rejected. The Soviets also rejected the
"erroneous

affirmation" by the London Poles that the area the Red
Army
was operating in was part of Poland.

said,

It

was well

that the "Soviet constitution established

known,

they

a

Soviet-Polish frontier corresponding with the desires of the
population of western Ukraine and western White Russia...
[and]the territories

... were

incorporated into the Soviet

Union." In other words the Soviets were operating within
their June 1941, borders.
On January 22,

[5]

Churchill met with the Premier of the

Polish government-in-exile, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, and

proposed

a

five point program as the basis for renewed
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recognition by the Soviets
Soviets. n.
The Premier was told that
if hi,
government would agree
aeree fto the acceptance of
the so-called
Curzon Line as the basis of
the western Polish frontier:
linking the eastern frontier
to the grant to Poland of
East
Prussia, Danzig and Upper
Silesia to
rt

the Oder River,

on the Soviet side of the
eastern

the right to return to Poland,

Poles

frontier would be granted

all Germans within the new

Polish frontiers would be removed,

and the guarantee these

agreements would be honored by the
three principal United
Nations, relations with the Soviets
could be resumed.

In

reality this was the agreement the "Big
Three" had reached
at Teheran. It was also the
outline of the new Poland Myron
Taylor had carried to Rome in September of
1942.

[6]

Churchill kept Stalin apprised of his negotiations
with the London Poles.

He

also cabled Roosevelt on the

position he was taking with Mikolajaczk. He informed the
Polish Premier that even though England had gone to war over
Poland they had not done so for the sake of "any particular

frontier," but rather for the existence of

a

strong,

free,

independent Poland." Churchill said Stalin also supported
this view,
to

and that even though England would have continued

fight Germany alone "the liberation of Poland from the

German grip is being achieved mainly by the enormous

sacrifices and achievements of the Russian armies." Poland
would have to accept the fact that the allies would have
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large say about "the
frontier .f territory she should
h ave."
The Poles were will ing to
consider the matter, according to
Churchill, but they refused to
settle border issues prior to
a general peace
conference after the
war.

[7]

The border issue became
secondary in early February.

Stalin informed British Ambassador
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
that at least three of the
members of the Polish

government-in-exile were unacceptable
not deal with them.

him and he would

FDR was anxious where this latest

difficulty would lead. On February
he

to

7,

he

cabled Stalin that

appreciated his desire "to deal only with

a

Polish

government in which you can repose confidence,"
and while
public opinion was still solidifying around
the

"broad

principles subscribed to at the Moscow and Teheran

conferences," it would be better

to

allow the Polish Prime

Minister to make changes in the makeup of that government
"without any evidence of pressure or dictation from

a

foreign country." [8]
While the question of Poland was beginning to heat up
the President

found himself embroiled in yet another issue

highlighting the

the

ability of the Vatican to bring both

domestic and international political pressure to bear on

American public opinion: the bombing of Rome. While Italy
formally surrendered to the Allies in September of 1943
stiff German resistance continued in that country. As Allied
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forces began to m0 ve up the
peninsula in early 1944 bombing
raids in Rome and other
military targets resulfced

^

and casualties within Vatican
City,

the Papal

Villa at

Castelgandolfo and the Abby of Monte
Casino.
By mid-February public
attention was being divided

between the deteriorating Polish
situation and the flurry of
diplomatic correspondence between the
Vatican and

Washington. Archbishop Ameleto
Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate
at Washington, was conveying
the objections to the Allied
bombing being made by Pius XII and Luigi
Cardinal Maglione,
Vatican Secretary of State, to the President
and the State

Department. The Vatican flatly denied Allied
military
reports that Monte Cassino and Castelgandolfo
were housing

German military personnel General Mark Clark of the
U.S.
.

Fifth Army later confirmed that no German military personnel
were using either site.

Archbishop Spellman notified

Roosevelt that he intended to speak out publicly on the
matter,

a

departure from the archbishop's usually cordial

relations with the President. At St. Patrick's Cathedral on

Washington's birthday Spellman deplored the fact that
American armed forces had attacked "the territory of

a

neutral state" in spite of the fact that the Pope himself
had denied that German troops were ever stationed in the

areas under attack.

[9]
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On March

12

and April

subject again,

as

bombing raids in and around Rome
continued

1

the archbishop spoke on the

damage churches and shrines.
The fact that Spellman would
speak out publicly against
the actions of American armed
to

forces in the midst of

a

popular war effort, and an election

/ear,

suggests the possibility that something
deeper was
involved. In fact, the Vatican
was marshaling an

international effort on the bombing issue.
On March
Irish Ambassador to the United States
delivered

a

15,

the

message

from Prime Minister deValera seeking
an agreement by which
"Rome may be saved." The Irish vote
could not be overlooked.

Similar appeals came from the Spanish
government, and from
several South American Republics. [10]
The situation was becoming serious in the eyes
of the

administration. On March

18,

Secretary Hull cabled all

diplomatic representatives in the South American Republics
to

"give your serious and urgent attention to the

possibility of discreetly stimulating some comment on the
part of high public officials, cultural leaders,

and

prominent newspapers" that responsibility for placing

Christian shrines in jeopardy in Rome lay with the Nazis,
who continued to use the city for military purposes,

and not

with the Allied airforce. The administration was promoting

counterattack of world opinion. Domestically, the situation
was not much better. A poll conducted in late April asked
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"Do you think the Allied
Airforce should bomb Rome?"

Nationally, only 37 percent
of

^

^

respo „ dents

while 57 percent said no,
and 12 percent had no opinion.
Among Catholics only 24
percent said yes with 67 percent
saying no an 9 percent with
no opinion. Protestant
response
»as 36 percent yes, 52 percent
no, and 12 percent no
opinion. Clearly, a majority of
American public opinion, led
by American Catholics, was
lined up against the

administration.

[11]

At virtually the same time

bombing of Rome, Reverend Gerald

that Spellman opposed the
G.

Walsh,

Professor of

History at New York's Fordham University
and editor of
Fordham's quarterly journal Thoug ht, spoke
to the Women's
Press Club of New York. The theme of Rev. Walsh's
speech was
the

postwar peace. He quoted from

"The real lesson of history

-

a

1939 speech of Pius XII:

that what is common to all men

and women is that they love the place where they were born,

and any future world must be planned on the premise that

they want their homeland to be free." In an obvious

reference to the recently concluded Teheran Conference Rev.
Walsh went on to say that peace plans currently under

discussion were merely "selfish nationalism based on the
military force of the Big Four." [12]
A respected Catholic historian and journalist,

in an

election year, was publicly questioning the conduct of the
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k

.

President'

postwar pls„„i„ g ln front of
an influe „ tlal
Sroup. His superior, Archbishop
Spelean,

"li.

s

had Just

Public!, questioned the President's
conduct of the war. And
this was not the first time
Spelean had used Fordhan, In an
election year to send the President
a message. In 1940, when
FDR was seeking an unprecedented
third tern,, Spellman

invited FDR to

a

Fordhan, ROTC inspection,

which was widely
ucj./ repAi-HpH
regarded in« the press as
i

4-

the
a

timing „f

subtle

endorsement of the President. The prospect
could not be
ignored that a breach was developing
between Roosevelt and
the Catholic hierarchy he had so
assiduously cultivated over
the years
In
to

the meantime,

present problems.

the Polish

border question continued

By early March,

the cables

between

Churchill and Stalin were becoming acrimonious. Stalin
accused Churchill of leaking confidential correspondence on
the Polish issue to the London press "with many distortions

which

I

have no possibility of refuting." Churchill

responded that the leak of information had come from the
Soviet Embassy in London, and in the case of The London
Tjrceg

had come directly from the Soviet Ambassador Feodor

Gusev. At the same time he informed Stalin that he would

announce in the House of Commons that efforts to resolve the

situation between the Polish and Soviet governments had
broken down, that Britain continued to recognize the
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Sovernment-.n-exile, that
tectorial .uestions must await
the postwar peace
conference, and that Britain
would
recognize no forcible transfers
of territory. Stalin
responded by saying he considered
Churchill's message "full
of threats," and accused
the Prime Minister of reneging
on
the Teheran agreements
concerning the restoration of the
Curzon Line. He said that if
Churchill delivered the speech
outlined in his message it would
be considered an "unjust
and unfriendly act towards
the Soviet Union." The Soviets

continued

to

refuse to deal with the Polish

government-in-exile, which both Britain and
the United
States recognized as the legitimate
government of Poland.
The Soviets also continued to claim
the area the Red Army
was currently operating in was not part
of Poland but part
of

the Soviet Union.

[13]

The President apparently thought he had clarified
the

nature of the political problems the Polish issue would

create for him with Stalin at Teheran, but the Soviet

Premier was doing nothing publicly which would help solve
the President's problems. Poland continued to remain an

issue in U.S. domestic politics. Suddenly, in late April,

a

Polish Roman Catholic priest from Springfield, Ma., Rev.

Stanislauv Orlemanski, arrived in Moscow, at the personal
invitation of Stalin, and was granted two private interviews
with the Soviet Premier. The State Department denied any
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.

connection with the Orlemanski
visit, saying hi£ visa had
been granted purely as a
private citizen visiting the
Soviet
Union. Bishop Oa=ar y of
the Diocese of Springfield
denied
that Orle.anski was on any
niS sion sanctioned by Church
authorities
While the State Department
continued to be rebuffed in
its efforts to obtain a visa
for a Catholic priest to travel
to the Soviet Union to assist
Father LeBraun in Moscow, a
Polish priest fro* a small parish
in Springfield not only
obtained a visa but was granted private
interviews
with

Stalin. While not well known outside
Polish-American circles
Orlemanski was not a stranger to either
Stalin or FDR. He
first came to the attention of the OSS
Foreign Nationals

Branch in the late summer of 1943. At that
time he

established

a

"Kosciuszko League" in his local parish to

give moral support to the Kosciuszko Division
which Stalin
had established in Russia to

fight with the Red Army. This

organization quickly came to the attention of

a

pro-Soviet

Polish-American group in Detroit which had been involved in
the bitter sit-down strike union struggle of the 1930's.

leader of this group, Waclaw Soyda, invited Orlemanski

Detroit to establish
to

making it

a

a

Kosciuszko League there as

national organization.

In early November Orlemanski

a

The

to

prelude

[14]

delivered

a

speech in

Detroit in which he attacked the Polish government-in-exile
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claiming they had "foresworn"
their ri g ht to represent the
Polish people when the fled
Poland. He also attacked their
Position on the territorial
question of borders, arguing
that only the "Polish landed
aristocracy was interested in
keeping the territory because
they held great estates
there." TAS^ issued a lengthy
report on the foundation of
the Kosciuszko League of
which Orlemanski was named

"honorary president." Branches of
the League sprang up in
Chicago, Winnipeg, Roxbury and
West Springfield. According
to an FBI report on the
League all the branches were largely
made up of "communists or communist
sympathizers." [15]
In

January, shortly after returning from
Teheran,

Stalin had Foreign Minister Molotov propose
to Ambassador

Harriman the inclusion of three Polish-Americans
as part of
the government-in-exile:

Oscar Lange,

University of Chicago, Leo Krzycki,
of the CIO,

and Orlemanski.

a

a

professor at the

leftist vice-president

Harriman was taken aback by the

proposal and told FDR not to dignify it with
February,

a

response.

In

however, Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko

requested that Lange and Orlemanski be permitted to visit
the Soviet Union.

At the same

time DeWitt Poole of the OSS

was reporting that Orlemanski was having second thoughts

about his association with the pro-Soviet groups. Poole's

report confirmed that Orlemanski was not

a

communist but "a

strange blend of naive patriot, shrewd peasant and loyal
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Catholic." He viewed h-i
his* *pro-Soviet .activity
as a means of
supporting FDR's position
iL10n that the
h Soviets
e
were our wartime
ally and declared that
"If Roosevelt would declare
war on
Russia today I would break
all my sympathies for the Russian
cause and as an American go
against Russia." [16]
(

*

While Father Orlemanski was
meeting with Stalin the
political power of the Polish vote
FDR was so concerned
about began to make itself felt.
Just how important the
Poles were politically became clear
when one hundred and

forty-seven speeches were made in congress
celebrating
Polish Independence Day on May
3, while Orlemanski was still
in Moscow. Jan C i e c h a no ws k
Polish Ambassador
i
to

,

the United

States notes in his memoirs that he was told
the Polish vote
was critical

to

the

President in five states;

Illinois,

Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and New York.
The connection between this analysis and the total

Catholic vote is dramatically supported by

a

survey of

religious affiliations conducted among the members of the
78th congress and reported in the Spring 1944 issue of

Public Opinio n Quarterly

.

The survey found that of 435

members of the House 80, or

18

percent,

were Catholic.

In

addition, 63 of the 80 were concentrated in nine states,

the

five listed by Ciechanowski along with Massachusetts,

California, Wisconsin and Louisiana. The importance of these
nine states,

representing 218 of the 266 electoral votes

124

needed to win the president
(over 80 percent), is quickly
evident for any presidential
candidate. Also, the Democrats
had suffered substantial
losses in the mid-term elections
o
1942 when their majority in
the House fell fro* 91 to only
14, and losing 8 Senate seats.
Clearly, an

erosion in the

Catholic vote represented by the
loss of the Poles would
jeopardize the President's chances
for

a

fourth term. No

wonder Hopkins had ter.ed the
Polish issue "political
dynamite ."[17]
The President needed some indication
from Stalin that
his concerns expressed at Teheran
over the Polish vote,
by implication the Catholic vote,

and

would be addressed. The

answer was forthcoming from Father Orlemanski.
On May

6

Father Orlemanski left Moscow to return to the
United State

carrying with him

a

letter signed by Stalin which dealt wit

the question of religious freedom in the Soviet
Union and
the possibility of cooperation between Stalin and Pius
XII

"in the matter of the struggle against persecution and

coercion of the Catholic Church." The American Embassy in

Moscow learned of the contents of the letter from Harrison

Salisbury of the United Press. Orlemanski had allowed
Salisbury to make
it

a

copy of the letter under the condition

would not be made public until he could discuss it with

Catholic authorities in the United States. [18]
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May

9

The Embassy cabled the
President and the Secretary on
that while Orlemanski
to the Soviet Union

„«

"Primarily interested in the
Polish question" he now
believed the letter he was
bringing back fro™ Stalin
into the ,uch broader field
of general relations

»

B0V ed

between the

Kremlin and the Catholic
OA
Churrh
uurch

"

••
-

n. pEmbassy
u
The
reported that

Orlemanski did not fppi
j
teel ran^Ki^
capable ofc dealing
with

a

subject of

that magnitude and would
submit the letter to Catholic

authorities in the United States.
Salisbury believed the
letter represented "a definite
manifestation of
a

desire to

bring about improved relations
between the Soviet Government
and the Catholic Church and to
remove

a

present source of

friction not only in Soviet-Polish relations
but also in
relations with the United States." The cable
concluded by

saying "The Embassy agrees with this estimate."
[19]
Stalin seems to have been using the visit of Father

Orlemanski, arranged by FDR, to send

a

message that he was

willing to compromise on the issue of religious freedom in
the areas of Eastern Europe that the Red Army will soon have

under its control,

and that FDR had already acknowledged to

Spellman would remain under Soviet control. Perhaps Stalin
felt this was the type of statement which Myron Taylor had

requested through Ambassador Maisky in London back in

October of 1942, or at least

negotiating such

a

a

starting point for

statement. Stalin was well aware of the
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President's preoccupation

w lt h

the question of

freedom of

worship in the Sonet Union,
dating back to the original
negotiations over recognition
in 1933.

Clearly, Stalin was as aware
as Roosevelt that
Catholicism could be the key to
the Polish problem. Polish

nationalism and Polish Catholicism
went hand-in-hand. The
staff at the American Embassy
in Moscow apparently believed
that Stalin was sincere in this
effort
to

relieve the

counting tension over the Polish
issue. Spellman noted in
his memo

to

the Vatican the President's hope
"that the

Russian intervention in Europe would
not be too harsh." With
this in mind,

and the President's repeated efforts
to assure

some measure of freedom of worship in
the Soviet Union, it

seems fair to conclude that FDR would view the
possibility
of

a

rapprochement between the Vatican and the Kremlin as

a

step in the right direction in terms of relieving
the

"harsh" Russian intervention in Europe. Domestic Catholic

reaction to such an arrangement could also be expected to be
less harsh in terms of possible defections from the

Democratic coalition.
However,

the State Department soon had reason to doubt

the supposed importance of Orlemanski's letter.

On May 24

Charles (Chip) Bohlen, Chief of the Division of Eastern

European Affairs, reported to the Deputy Director of the

Division the gist of

a

conversation between Andre Visson of
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New Vor,

toMUUtol

and Viadiair Pravdin,

head

Soviet lass Agenrv,. According
to Vtsson, Pravdin told
hi, it was the intent o
£
the Soviet government to
support a
"weli organized, dynamic
and state-controiled Orthodox
Church which would nave
have great
?r Pa t influence
nf1
throughout the
Balkans and the Near East"
after the war. Pravdin doubted
the Vatican would respond
favorably to the Orlemanski letter
because it was too "well informed"
not to recognize Soviet
backing of the Orthodox Church as
a much greater "threat to
Catholicism than Atheistic Communism had
ever been." Pravdin
concluded by saying it was necessary to
;

have "some force to

combat the Vatican" and as Protestantism
was too divided
do

so

to

"the only force capable of doing so was
the Greek

Orthodox Church controlled by the Soviet Government
In

the meantime,

the context

[20

military events were rapidly changing

within which the political discussions were

taking place. On June

4

Allied forces liberated Rome. Two

days later Allied Armies landed at Normandy and the

long-awaited second front was finally established. Some
Stalin's resentment seems to have given way to his

of

enthusiasm over the landing on the continent. He cabled
Churchill "the landing, conceived on

a

grandiose scale, has

succeeded completely," and that "the history of warfare
knows no other like undertaking from the point of view of
its scale,

its vast conception,
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and its masterly execution."

,

He

was obviously plea«?PH
~ have
7 Pleased fto
some of the pressure taken
off the eastern front.
v,

[21]

On June 5,

the very eve of the
Normandy invasion,

Stanislaw Mikola jc2 yk, Preraier
of
"in-exile, arrived in Washington
first meeting took place on
June

^

polish government

for talks with FDR
7,

.

The

and Jan Ciechano wski

Polish Ambassador to the U.S.
described FDR as being in good
spirits following the successful
landing the previous day.
FDR repeatedly stressed to
Mikolajczyk the need for the

government-in-exile
Soviets.

"When

a

to

reach an accommodation with the

thing becomes unavoidable one should
adapt

oneself to it," FDR said, and asked
Mikolajczyk if he agreed
with that theory. When the Polish Premier
replied that the
Soviet demands were irreconcilable with the
concept of

Polish independence and sovereignty, FDR replied:
"remember
there are five times more Russians than Poles" and that

Russia "could swallow up Poland if she could not reach an

understanding on her terms."
Clearly, Roosevelt was trying to to impress on the

Polish Premier the seriousness of the situation facing the
Poles.

In his memo

to

the Vatican,

Spellman recorded what

FDR told him regarding the Soviet position on Poland and at
one point remarked "Poland

Eastern Prussia

."

if

,

reestablished, would get

(emphasis added) FDR obviously feared for

the very existence of Poland,

and Soviet military might was
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s

already dictating the realiHo.
realities of the situation on
the
Sr0
d
POland
JUSt
»• Soviets refused t0 aclM>lti8e
the Red Ar»y was in Poland
rather t „ an Rus£ia
i

" ^

they

c„„H

"

'

i„

fact>

as FDR

^

^

..^^

^

up „

^

Poland. For FDR the very
existence of Poland was at stake,
and if Poiand ceased to
exist what would be the reaction
of

African Poles

and their fellow,

anti-com.unist Catholics?

succeed in reestablishing the
Polish state would be
major diplomatic achievement,
even if some territorial
To

concessions were needed
fears.

to

a

compensate for Soviet security

FDR was 6eivine
thp P^Ipc
k *
roles the
same message in June
" 5 tne
+-

that Churchill gave them in January.
[22]
FDR then said he thought it would be
constructive for

Mikolajczyk to meet personally with Stalin.
However, the
Polish Premier replied that without the support
of

the

President Stalin would insist on acceptance of his

conditions prior to any meeting; he asked Roosevelt
Stalin he supported the government-in-exile

Roosevelt replied that

as

a

*

s

to

tell

position.

politician himself, Mikolajczyk

could understand that in his "political year" he could not

intervene with Stalin on the Polish issue. Both men were

obviously concerned with the impact of American public
opinion. Mikolajczyk was hoping to force the President's
hand into public support of the government-in-exile
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'

^

position on the frontier
issue by playing t ,
Polish electorate he knew
FDR needed in November.
Roosevelt, having already

^

agreed to ,„ch of Stalin's

position on the frontier issue
at Teheran, was trying to
preserve see semblance of a
Polish state, and reaoh a
co.pro.i.e acceptable to Poles
in the United States as well
as Poland. One way to do
that would be to insure the
reestablishn,e„t of the Polish state
after the war, and to
insure that Poles would be able
to practice their Catholic
religion.

Subsequent conversations between Roosevelt
and

Mikolajczyk revolved around the efforts of the
Polish Home
Army,
in

and the need to supply them now that the
Soviets were

Poland.

The President agreed that the underground army

was performing vital services to the Allies by
disrupting

German activities behind the front. FDR used this issue

to

stress again the need for Mikolajczyk to meet personally
with Stalin and inform him of the strength and activities of
the Home Army.

He

felt Stalin would be impressed and would

agree to coordinate Red Army plans with the Poles in order
to

defeat the Germans.
The conversation then took an interesting turn.

FDR

brought up Father Orlemanski's visit to Moscow. He said he
had been asked to meet with the priest but had not yet

decided if he would.

It

is

interesting to note FDR's comment
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that he had not yet
decided on feting with
OrlcansRi On
June 2 the President was
sent a roe roo by Secretary
Hull
advising against such a me^-ino- u
meeting. Hull disagreed with
the
idea that the offer brought
back fro, Stalin represented a
"real departure fro, the
position of the Soviet government."
He referred to the
"criticism from Po 1 i s h - Ame r i c an and
.

-i

Catholic circles

."

i

Hull believed all the information
that

could be gathered on Orlemanski's
visit with Stalin had been
obtained in the OSS interview
conducted with him on his
return and that an "off the record"
meeting could not be
kept secret and would generate more
"unfortunate publicity."
Besides, Orlemanski had been summarily
suspended from his

parish duties and ordered to the Passionist
Monastery in
West Springfield by Bishop Thomas O'Leary
of the Springfield
Diocese. Bishop O'Leary had been contacted by the
Apostolic

Delegate Archbishop Ameleto Cicognani wanting to know
"what

provision had been made for the parish of Father
Orlemanski." The reasons given for Orlemanski

'

s

suspension

were that he had left his parish without permission,

and

that he had consorted with communists in violation of Pius

XI's 1937 encyclical.

It

was obvious the reaction of the

American Catholic Church was not what Orlemanski had
expected
In

.

[

23

]

any case,

FDR told Mikolajczyk he was interested in

the part of the priest's meeting with Stalin in which they
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•

had discussed freedom
off v^i
oid °
rell 8ion in Russia,
particularly
freed ° m
R ° raan Cat ^lic
Church. Stalin was reported
to

have said he had no
objection to freedom of religion,
only to the fact that
there were so many religions
in the
world. He added that to
give religious freedom to one
or two

denominations would result in
do 2 ens more applying and
felt,
"it might he better to
unify religions." According to
Jan
Ciechanowski the President felt this
statement "might be an
indication that Stalin would favor
a

union between the

Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic
churches," and he might
even be willing "to admit the Pope's
leadership and allow
him to become head of the two united
churches."
The President was making quite

concerning cooperation with Pius XII
head

a

a

to

leap from the note

allowing the Pope to

united church in Russia. Perhaps the President
had in

mind Bohlen's memo outlining Stalin's postwar
plan,

and the

possibility of working around that problem. The President
then asked Mikolajczyk what he thought of Stalin's comments,
and the Premier replied that Stalin could indicate his

sincerity by releasing the Catholic priests imprisoned in
the Soviet Union.
to

The President then turned the conversation

other matters. FDR did not divulge to the Polish Premier

that the American Embassy in Moscow believed Stalin's

remarks were intended as

a

gesture "to remove

a

source of

friction" in Soviet-Polish relations. Neither did he attempt
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to

certain

the p„te„ tial threat
to Poli£h Catholicism of

,

revitalised Orthodox Church
under Soviet domination,
expressed in Bohlen's memo.
[24]

On June

14 Mikolajczyk,

ha vi„ s

failed to extract

a

public commitment from FDR
to support the governme„t-i„axile's position on the
frontier issue, returned to London.
The following day Roosevelt
lunched with Archbishop Spellman
and made arrangements for
the Catholic prelate to fly to
Rome on an Air Force
tv„
-Diane
rorce plane.
The President quickly informed
Stalin that the visit of Mikolajczyk
to Washington would
have no bearing on their Teheran
agreements. FDR cabled the
Soviet Premier on June 17, and in
t>

what may have been

reference to the upcoming U.S. elections
stated

"I

a

deemed

his visit at this time as desirable
and necessary for

reasons which Ambassador Harriman had already
explained to
you." The President expressed the opinion
that Mikolajczyk
was most concerned about the cooperation of the
Red Army

with the Polish Home Army and the need to coordinate
their

activities to defeat the Germans. He stated that Mikolajczyk
would be willing to go to Moscow to discuss the problems
between the Soviet Union and his government-in-exile, but

took no position favoring the Polish viewpoint as requested
by the Polish Premier. FDR concluded by saying,

understand,

I

know,

that

I

personal views upon you in

"You will

am in no way trying to press my
a

matter which is of special
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concern to you and your
country." „. Preaident was
aCk "° Kled|in8
S ^«^l s i6 „
ificance attached t0 the
Polish situation in term*
terms «t
of security to the
Soviet Uni
expressed by Stalin. [251
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9

CULTS AND VOTES

On July 1,1944,

Averell Harridan notified the
State

Department of an announcement in
Moscow concerning the
creation of a Council for the
Affairs of Religious Cults
under the Council of the
Commissars of the USSR

.

The council

was to provide liaison between
the government and religious

cults in the USSR, including the
Catholic and the Greek
Catholic churches. Bohlen was quick to
recognize one

possible implication of the new council.
He viewed it as
potentially a positive step giving a "greater
degree of

recognition than heretofore accorded" these
religions and
said the council should be viewed in
connection with the

"assurances given by Stalin to Father Orlemanski concerning
the Catholic Church." He concluded that the
council was

"undoubtedly related with the Polish question and is
probably designed to provide machinery to handle questions
involving the Catholic population of eastern Poland which
the Soviet government intends to incorporate in the Soviet

Union." [1]
The Orlemanski mission was continuing to influence

State Department thinking in spite of Hull's rejection of
the letter from Stalin as offering nothing new to

Soviet-Polish relations. Bohlen had not forgotten the
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Pravdin conversation, however,
and pointed out that "the
Greek Orthodox faith ...„„
virtually bee „ reC0s „ l2ed as
State religion and
unquestionably win be utilized
in

^

that

guise as

political instrument of the
Soviet State." No
other religion was going to
be allowed to "develop to
a
point where they might threaten
the position of the official
Orthodox church." [2]
a

On July 12

the Pope's most recent concerns
over the

Soviet Union were revealed

to

Myron Taylor in

a

lengthy

audience. The Pope raised three
issues with Taylor: the
spread of communism in Europe and
"its development in a

strong way in Italy, the "Russian
attitude toward Poland"
and the "Russian attitude re:

freedom of religion

generally." Taylor had told Joseph Davies that
he was

disappointed the Vatican had not responded favorably
Orlemanski mission. Now he presented to the Pope
a

a

to

the

draft of

statement which evolved following his discussions with

Ambassador Maisky in London in 1942 dealing with the form

of

"assurance to be made by Marshal Stalin [that] would be

acceptable." He also informed the Pope that he had
"discussed the subject with the President of the United
States, with Secretary Hull and others, including members of
the Catholic hierarchy in America."

[3]

The statement Taylor provided to the Pope contained
two elements.

The first called on the Soviets to publicly
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P-claim "complete
01

wo rship

acknowledges

of

of

^

reedom of religiou£

in all Soviet territory>(

with article 124

of

f

This wQuid

.

the Soviet constitution
and

^ ^
an

"the loyal participation
in the defense

the Fatherland by all
Russian people," assumably

including Catholics. The second
stipulated that "Any abuse
of these privileges,
whether to organize movements or
incite
the people to overthrow the
Government,
will be dealt with

in each case according to
law." Taylor said both Pius XII
and his political advisor
Monsignor Tardini accepted the

first point but rejected the second.
Following his audience
with the Pope, Taylor met with Tardini
who presented him
with a lengthy raemor andum outlining the
Vatican's objections
to

Soviet behavior toward the Catholic Church
in Russia,

which Tardini said showed no significant
improvement since
the war began.

The memorandum concluded "in view of what has

been stated above and after the sad experience of the
past,
it

is necessary to

follow

a

policy of watchful expectation

and reserve. "[4]
The Vatican did not rule out the possibility of

reaching an agreement with the Kremlin, but preferred to
watch developments unfold. Taylor suggested to FDR raising
the issue at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference,

convened in Washington. FDR returned

a

which has just

message to Taylor

telling him he had reached "the reluctant conclusion that at
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this particular moment
it would h«
be unwise to raise the
issue
[religious freedom] openly
He said the Russians
were "most
sensitive" and might consider
such a request an "affront"
to
the various statements
they had already made
concerning
"freedom of worship in the
Soviet Union." Instead, FDR
wanted to pursue a policy of
exerting U.S. "influence
quietly and constantly " to
obtain "practical tests of
Soviet respect for that principle."
This he believed was
*ore in keeping with the Vatican's
position that they were
"wary of statements and intent
upon concrete application."
[5]

By late July,

fronts.

events were coming together on all

FDR was overwhelmingly renominated
by the Democratic

Convention to seek

a

fourth term; Archbishop Spellman was in

Rome where the American press was speculating
on his "real

mission" as he had been granted several private audiences
with the Pope,
to

and Polish Premier Mikolajczyk flew to Moscow

talk personally with Stalin. On the same day the Pope

gave

a

speech encouraging Poles to work with the advancing

Soviet armies.

In

an

address to 500 Polish soldiers, the

Pope "asked that Poles not seek vengeance against the

Germans or Russians that overran Poland in 1939, but in fact
should collaborate with the Russians." Pius said he was
still seeking an independent Poland. Members of the

diplomatic corps, commenting on the speech, said they
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believed it was extremely
cautious

waning when seen
on July 12

in the context

.

of

This speech

^

^

_

the conversations held

with Myron Taylor. Pius
wass publicly

acknowledging Catholics ability

to

cooperate with the Soviet

Union within days of being
told the President of the United
States was still working to
produce a satisfactory agreement
which would guarantee the church
freedom of movement in
eastern Europe, even if under
Soviet control. [6]
On August

from Moscow,

the

1,

with encouragement

from radio broadcasts

Polish underground in Warsaw began
open

resistance to the Germans occupying the
city. The Hed Army
was only 10 miles from Warsaw and
the Poles expected a quick
Soviet advance to liberate the city. By
early September,
however,

it

was clear that the Red Army was not going to

assist the uprising.
the uprising began.

It

remained exactly where it was when

Pleas for assistance from Stalin met

with excuses that military necessity prevented resupplying
the underground or advancing on Moscow.

He

also refused

permission for U.S. planes to land at Soviet bases if they
attempted to drop supplies. Churchill was furious and tried
to

get FDR to agree to send American planes to drop supplies

to

the Poles,

and land at Russian bases without permission.

While the President complained to Stalin along with

Churchill about the lack of help to the embattled Poles, he
was not willing to follow the Prime Minister's latest plan.
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]

To do so

would have destroyed
the basis of trust which
FDR
was trying to establish
with Stalin. FDR finally
notified
Churchill that he was informed
the underground Poles had
left Warsaw and "There
now appears to be nothing
we can do
to assist the,." The
fighting continued, however,
for
another month. Finally, ln
what Robert DalleR has
apparently cynical effort to refute
accusations that they
wished to see Poland's no n -c
o „un i s t underground destroyed,"
and after yet another British
appeal, the Red Army resu.ed
its advance on Warsaw, dropped
supplies to the Poles and
agreed to let American planes land
at Soviet bases after
dropping supplies. It was too late,
however, and the

^

rebellion was crushed with some 250,000
Polish casualties.
[7]

the meantime,

In

the President was involved in

a

bitter reelection campaign. Polls conducted in August
and

early September showed Republican candidate Thomas
holding

a

46

Dewey

narrow lead over FDR overall, but in key electoral

vote states Dewey was ahead by large margins:
to

E.

Illinois, 54

percent; Ohio, 54 to 46 percent; Michigan, 57 to 43

percent; Wisconsin, 56 to 44 percent. These were the same

states cited by Ciechanowski where the Polish vote could
make the difference. By early October FDR was clinging to

narrow 51 to 49 percent lead nationally
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.[ 8

a

It

was beginning to
appear that the President's

£

ear

,

expressed to Stalin at
Teheran, was becoming a reality.
Events in Poland were driving
Poles to see, answers fro.
the
President. Just what was his
position on Poland? Jan
Ciechanowski clai ras he was
repeatedly being asked by various
Roosevelt campaign operatives
his opinion
on what would be

the most effective way to
ensure the "Polish vote." And it

cannot be forgotten,

as

the Orlemanski affair,
a

Secretary Hull pointed out during
"Catholic circles" were also showing

great interest in Poland.
On August 15,

Secretary Hull forwarded to FDR

a

memorandum from Taylor dealing with the
source of the
information which had led to the Pope's
belief that American
Catholics supported a negotiated settlement
to

the

war.

Taylor had heard from the British Minister to
the Holy See,
Sir D'Arcy Osborne,

that Archbishop Spellman had made the

same comment to him. Secretary of the Navy James
Forrestal,

currently in Rome, indicated that Spellman told him the same
thing prior to leaving for Rome. Taylor felt these

disclosures "may indicate

a

movement to bring about

a

negotiated peace, along lines undisclosed to us directly."
It

seems entirely possible that Spellman was advocating to

the Pope

a

policy that would bring an end to the war before

Russian armies could occupy the areas of Eastern Europe that
FDR had told him

a

year earlier would certainly remain under
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Soviet domination.
the prospect of

asainst FDR

Ca,PaiS "'

a

may

al£<;

potent!.!

f0 rei e „

atteroptins

„„ lt

pollcy la

I—

JUSt

^

of

^

30 ,000 000 Catholioo
,

^

^

of Six or seven Billi
on

Polish voters. Whatever
his motives, Ta yl or was
spending
-uch of his tine trying to
convince the Pope that "there
is
no possibility of a ne rn ti a f D „ ~
negotiated peace and that the
only terms
that will be offered
rterea to
tn the
t-h.
r~
German Army are unconditional
surrender." [9]
On October 11,

the White House

accompanied by photos, of
of

a

issued

a

press release,

meeting between FDR and members

the Polish American Congress,

the same group that had led

the attack against Orlemanski's
visit.

The Poles were at the

White House to get the President's
views on the continued

application of the principles of the Atlantic
Charter, and
specifically how those principles applied to
Poland.

According to Ciechano wski

,

the Polish language press in the

United States was not satisfied with the President's

answers. Roosevelt knew of the continued dissatisfaction,
and arranged another meeting with Charles Rozmarek
of the

PAC aboard his campaign train in Chicago on October
28,

seven days before the election. Ciechanowski says the

President promised Rozmarek that he would "take active steps
to

insure the independence of Poland." The next day Rozmarek

endorsed the Democratic ticket. The President was being
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disingenuous with Rozmarei,
u. was
Kosaarek. He
indeed pursuing
for an independent
Poland, it was

a

policy

Just not the sane Po la „d

the Poles were talking
about

Premier Mikolajczyk,
/
>

"When
wnen

a

But>

.

*hi
ncr
thing

as

^

^

^

u
becomes
unavoidable one

should adapt oneself to it."
[10]

Meanwhile, Republican candidate
Dewey was doing his
best to revive with voters
the anti-communist theme of
Father Coughlin. In a speech
at Boston, Dewey told his
audience that FDR had put his
party on the auction block,
and the highest bidder was
the Communist Party. "Now the

Communists are seizing control of the
New Deal," Dewey said,
"through which they aim to control
the Government of the
United States." He suggested that FDR
pardoned Earl Browder
in

time to help organize for the fourth
term bid. Roosevelt

was furious,

but his advisors were telling him he had
to

answer the charges because "the voters were more
afraid of

communism than fascism." [11]
The Polish vote held,

reelection on November

4,

however,

and the President won

but although the electoral vote

count was overwhelmingly in Roosevelt's favor,

the margin of

victory in the nine key states identified earlier as having
strong Polish or Catholic votes, was narrow indeed.

In most

cases FDR won these states by the narrowest of any of his

previous elections, and his ability

to

hold the Catholic

vote could indeed be pointed to as the margin of victory.
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The President won
Pennsylvania
yxvania w-ifh
si percent
with 51
of the vote
and his plurality of
105 ,000 was over
500,000 less than J.
!93 6 victor,. Illinois
„ as

virtuaJly

^^
^^^^
^

New Vork 52.3 percent
Percent, Michigan 50.2
percent.
the President won „ lth
56 percent „ f

In

California
&?

Percent in 1936. Ohio and
Wisconsin went Hepublican for the
first tine since 1928.
James MacGregor Burns pointed
out
that it was "remarkable that
a forty-two-year-old
governor
with experience in neither
war nor diplomacy could come
so
close to toppling a world
leader at the height of a global
war." Soon after the election
the Catholic hierarchy served
notice that it might not be so easy
to maintain the Catholic
vote in the future. [12]
On November

13,

a

week after the election,

American Catholic Bishops released

a

the

resolution on eastern

Europe passed by the administrative board
of the National

Catholic Welfare Conference. The resolution noted
the
"sufferings,

misery and fears" of their fellow bishops,

clergy and religious throughout all of Europe and "The

circumstances of the moment excite in them

a

particular

anxiety for the fate of religion among their fellow

Christians in Poland, the Baltic States, and neighboring
Catholic lands." The resolution concluded,

"American

Catholics would ever resent their country's being made
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a

Party to the

peoples

.

"

[

13

de

-Chris t i am z at ion of
historic Catholic

]

Three days later, On
November 16
the bishopfi released
a second,
more lengthy statement
on "International Order."
With victory in the war
seeming .ore certain each day the
statement opened "We have met
the Challenge of War. Shall we
meet the challenge of Peace?"
The bishops statement was in
response to the recently concluded
Dumbarton Oaks
Conference. The State Department
had asked for comments from
the public on the establishment
of an international
,

organization aimed
limes_ carried

a

at

securxng future peace. The New York

page one story on the bishop's
statement and

reprinted the entire text on an inner
page. The Times
concluded the bishops were not opposed to
the creation of
such an organization,

principles on which

it

but were putting

should be guided. The statement said

"We have no confidence in

effect,
of

the

forward moral

a

peace which does not carry into

without reservations or equivocations the principles

the Atlantic Charter." This seems

a

direct reference to

previous statement on conditions in eastern Europe.

[14]

Proper organization of the international community was

essential to establishing

a

just peace,

according to the

bishops, and "To do this we must repudiate absolutely the

tragic fallacies of

'power polities'

power, spheres of influence in
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a

with its balance of

system of puppet

governments,

«

and the resort to
war as

international

di

c ul t * o
acuities.

f f i

i

»

1144.1.

Without specifically mentioning

the Soviet Union the
bishops
isnops saiH
said
in

its internal life la

"rw
a
The ideology

community" and stipulated
that as
"every nation guarantee in

1

.

concern Qf

a

means of settling

a

a

^

of

a

nation

internafcional

condition of membership

law and respect in fact the

innate rights of men

,

families and minority groups in
their

civil and religious life."

continuing to call for

a

m

essence the bishops were

statement guaranteeing religious

freedom in the Soviet Union and
the countries of eastern
Europe
15
.

[

]

The bishops had just raised the
stakes.

Poland was no

longer an isolated ethnic political
issue, if it ever had
been. It was now a Catholic issue,
as
was the

eastern Europe.

fate of all

FDR could not have been mistaken about
what

the bishops were saying.

The statement was signed by Edward

Mooney, Archbishop of Detroit; Samuel Stritch,

Archbishop of

Chicago; Francis Spellman, Archbishop of New York;
John

McNicholas, Archbishop of Cincinnati and John Noll,
of

Fort Wayne.

Bishop

These were all the President's old friends,

the men who defended him in his battle over Mexico,

the charges leveled by Father Coughlin;

against

the men whose

position on Spain had influenced his policy.
Just what effect was all this having on American

public opinion? A poll conducted that same November revealed
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that

a

Miorlty

of

the American peopie
stiii beiieved

could be trusted to cooperate
with the Allies after the
war
by a margin of
47 to 35 percent, while 18
percent did not
know. The poll was further
broken down by income groups and
religious affiliation. Trust
in continued Russian
cooperation was highest in the
upper-income group with 56
percent overall believing i n
continued cooperation. However,
there was a 14 percent difference
within this group between
Catholics and Protestants; 44 percent
of Catholics believing
Russia could not be trusted compared
to only 30 percent of
Protestants. The margin of distrust narrowed
in the

middle-income group where 34 percent of
Catholics distrusted
the Russians and 31 percent of
Protestants. Among
lower-income groups 48 percent of Catholics
distrusted
Russia compared to 34 percent of Protestants.
Clearly,
although still not

a

majority,

distrust of Russia's postwar

cooperation was running high as the war drew to

a

close,

and

American Catholics were far more likely to distrust Russian

intentions than their fellow Americans.
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CHAPTER 10
"SAUL ON THE ROAD TO
DAMASCUS

As 1945 opened it was
becoming increasingly clear
that

Stalin intended

January

to

have his way on the Polish
question. On

he

formally recognized the Polish
Committee of
National Liberation, known as
the Lublin Committee, as the
Provisional government of Poland.
This was a move that both
FDR and Churchill had been
attempting to forestall until the
Big Three met at Yalta.
Anglo-American forces in the west
were just beginning to regain
the offensive following the
breach of their lines in the Battle
of the Bulge. And the
3

public was beginning to have serious
doubts regarding the
conduct of the President's foreign
policy. Pollster Hadley
Cantril reported to the President in early
January that his
polls showed "a significant decline since
the previous June
in

public confidence that the President and other
officials

were successfully handling the nation's interests
abroad."
[1]

The President knew he was faced with

a

potentially

disastrous domestic political situation as he prepared

to

leave for Yalta. The polls showed Catholic opinion in the

country at much higher levels of distrust in continued
postwar cooperation with Russia, and overall opinion on the

President's policies was now down as well. The Catholic
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.

hierarchy had callpH
~+.
called into
question the cornerstone of
the
President's peace Pl a„, and
challeneed
^
^
Principles of the Atlantic
Charter. Accordi„ s to Edward
J
Flynn the situation °off Paku.i
Cathollcs in eastern Europe was
"
on
FDR's mind as he prepared
to leave
-i

^^

^

j

for Yalta.

Ta

" 3ny

Bronx,

Flynn,

a

aSS ° C iate of A1 Smith and
political boss of the
tied his political future
to FDR following the

disastrous 1928 election. Smith
never forgave him, and when
FDR wanted New York Governor
Herbert Lehman
to

to

the U.S.

appoint Flynn

Senate seat being vacated by
Roosevelt's

nomination of Senator Royal Copeland as
Ambassador to
Germany Smith effectively blocked
the nomination. Lehman
would not make the nomination without
Smith's approval as he
felt he owed his election as Governor
to Smith's
backing,

and Smith would not give his approval.
In

the

long term,

however,

the

[2]

backing of

a

powerful,

popular President proved more beneficial to Flynn
than the
lack of approval from the ex-governor and defeated

Presidential candidate. Flynn was named Democratic National
Chairman by FDR in 1940, and now, in 1945, would be thrust
into the international limelight by FDR

.

According to Flynn,

FDR raised the issue of the "position of the Roman Catholic

Church in Russia and the Balkans after the war," during

conversation in the White House. Flynn said FDR told him
"there could never be

a

permanent peace unless the large
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a

Catholic populations in p.i, nJ
Poland, Lithuania and
the Balkans
"are permitted to practice
their
•
fait* freely.

He

then

aaked Flynn to accompany
hi. on the trip to Yalta
and take
UP the problem with Stalin
ana Molotov
The
Qf

^

.

conversation described hy Flynn
see.s to indicate that FDR
had not changed his
position on Russian

donation

of

eastern Europe that he outlined
to Spelean in September
of
1943, but was continuing to zr
6
to tind a means
y tn
° trv
of

making it

"less harsh." [3]
On January 22,

as

the President

boarding for the journey
utuc J to
r

Yalt-,
iaj.ta,

a

and his party were

single page document

was prepared in the White House
for the President's

signature.

It

was addressed "To all diplomatic,

consular,

army and navy officers of the United
States Government." The

document said the bearer,
was "engaged in

Moscow,

a

"the Honorable Edward J.

mission for me which involves

with the approval of Marshal Stalin,

Flynn,"
visit to

a

and also

visit to Italy before returning to the United States."

a

It

then instructed all personnel coming in contact with Flynn
to

"permit him to pass, without let or molestation," and to

extend to him all courtesies normally associated with

diplomatic personnel. The President, apparently with the
approval of Stalin,

was in effect granting Flynn

a

personal

passport allowing him to travel anywhere in Europe under
U.S.

military control. [4]
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While FDR

see.

to

have been embarking on
yet another

^

atte.pt to resolve the
divisions befcween
Kremlin, Stalin was
apparently e mbarking on his
plan
While the Bi 6 Three were
ne g otiatin g at Valta
0eor 6 e Kennan,
now back in the Moscow
Embassy as
was sending a
Slurry of cables to the
State Department dealing with
so,
rather remarkable events
taking place in Moscow surrounding
the Russian Orthodox Church.
A Holy Synod of the
Russian
Orthodox Eastern Church had been
convened for purposes of
electing a new Patriarch of Moscow.
Invitations had been
extended "through official Soviet
diplomatic channels" to

_

^^

Ch^,

the patriarchs of Constantinople,

Antioch, Alexandria and

Jerusalem. The Patriarchs of Antioch
and Alexandria accepted
personally and the others sent "rather
imposing delegations
of

Metropolitans, Archbishops and Bishops." The
visitors

were treated as official dignitaries,

and shown great

hospitality by the Soviet government,

(including

performance of the Moscow Ballet).
The Synod elected Alexei,
and Novgorod,

a

[5]

Metropolitan of Leningrad

as Patriarch on February 2,

and an elaborate

coronation ceremony was planned for February

4,

which Kennan

described as "in effect the ceremonial climax to the

reestablishment of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union."
Kennan followed his first cable with

a

second interpreting

the events and placing them in their political context.
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The

-viva!

of the MoscOH
patriarch

spontaneous

M ,«„„t

on

the

nothing

^

^ ^

part 0{ the church but

[of,

a

deliberate policy „„ the
part of the Soviet Regime."
The
»v. was seen as an atte.pt
to promote an "all-Slav"
policy
based on the relig i0 us
sentiments Qf
, Slav populati<>ns
areas coming under Soviet
.,
oviet rcontrol.
.,t„i Also,
the revival would
Provide the Soviets a channel
of communication "to all
believers of the Eastern
Church.

a

^

...An iron in the

Hear Eastern politics through
Russian Church
Property. ..[andja means of
disarming criticism.

.

fire of

.in „ester„

religious circles. "[6]
On February 8,

Kennan sent another cable on the

implications of the recent religious
activity in Moscow
dealing with the Soviet attitude
toward the Roman Catholic
Church. He thought the fact the Soviet
government was
sponsoring the reemergence of the Russian
church might
the result of

be

"the unfruitful outcome of Father Orleraanski's

mission." Kennan felt the failure of Moscow and
Rome to
reach an agreement following Stalin's statement
to

Orlemanski resulted in the ability of the Russian Church to
emerge from "its former obscurity". He added that "Today,
all things indicate that the Kremlin is prepared to do open

battle against the influence of the Vatican." The Soviet

press was currently attacking the Vatican openly, but "How
this anti-Catholic tendency will affect Soviet policy in
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Poland,
He

Hungary and Croatia is
hoHever

,

tm

„ Qt

apparent

_„

felt the Soviets policy
toward Catholics in Central

Europe would Present
prespnt

Church diplomacy."

ut
,
highly
delicate
problem for Russian

"k-i

a
a

[

7

^

]

When William Bullitt wrote
to FDR in early 1943 he
warned the President against
the widespread assumptions
taking hold that Stalin had
"changed his political
Philosophy," that he "has abandoned
all idea of world
communism" and wanted to "have
the Soviet Union evolve in
the direction of liberty and
democracy, freedom of speech
and freedom of relieion
^ ^
tej-igion. " Tn
ro accept
such a view he said
"implies a conversion of Stalin as
striking as the
,

conversion of Saul on the road to Damascus."
As Ed Flynn
flew to Moscow with Averell Harriraan
following the Yalta

Conference he was embarking on

a

mission that was directly

contrary to the most recent evidence of Soviet
intentions
expressed by Kennan. A policy that had been revealed
to the
State Department eight months earlier.
On February 14,

[8]

The New York Times reported that Flynn

flew to Moscow with Ambassador Harriman. The story said

Flynn had taken no part in the Crimea Conference but had

simply accompanied the President "as an old friend and

associate." In conclusion, the story said "It was emphasized
that there was no significance in Mr.

Flynn's mission to the

Soviet Union." The following day, The Times reported on
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Flynn's activity
ln M0SC0W sa ^ng he
y -in
sat next to Soviet
Foreign Commissar Molot-ou
»*.
nolotov at
a performance of
the Bolshoi
Ballet. The story said
"WhilP
while Mr
ri
Mr. Flynn
said he had no
official mission here he
was much interested in
Poland."
Only after several weeks
did T^-Ji^ begin to
£uspect that
Flynn was up to more in
Moscow than a simple vacation.
In a story datelined
Rome on March 6, The Time.
confirmed that Flynn would
visit the Pope after leaving
Moscow. According to the
report, "Despite President
Roosevelt's bypassing of a press
conference question
concerning Mr. Flynn"s mission to
Moscow, the impression
prevails that Mr. Flynn has been
selected to provide the
preliminary liaison between Moscow and
the Vatican and that
he

may become the key figure in an
eventual rapprochement."

The story concluded by saying
Archbishop Spellman of New

York was expected in Rome at the same
time as Flynn.
By the time Flynn reached Rome his mission
was front

page news.

On March 23,

as

the war in Europe was raging

toward its conclusion, The Times reported Flynn had
been

granted an audience with Pius XII which lasted "far longer
than the usual personal pilgrimage." It also reported that

Flynn met with bishops Montini and Tardini of the Vatican

Secretariat of State. According to The Times
smiled and said

'no

comment*

at

a

.

"Mr.

Flynn

press conference when

asked if he had discussed with Premier Stalin efforts toward
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]

rapprochement between Moscow
m«„
and the Holy See.
think I ought to discuss
a

it

until

I

'

.

"

[

don't

get home and discuss it

with him [Roosevelt],'
but admitted rgports

speculation

'I

,

^^^

10

By this time FDR had
received

a

preliminary report

from Harriman indicating
there still might be a possibility
of success. On March
14 Harriman sent a top-secret
dispatch
to

the President telling him
that Flynn had concluded the

Moscow portion of his mission
and had left for Rome, by way
of Teheran. Harriman said
Flynn met
twice with Molotov,

"Although he declined to give Ed

a

and

message to the Vatican,

Molotov showed undisguised interest
in the subject." He said
Molotov was pessimistic about the
possibility of success but
"he indicated without saying so
directly that he was open to

suggestions." He believed, however, that the while
the door
was still open the ending of hostility would
have to begin

with Rome.

[11]

While in Moscow, John Melby,

a

Foreign Service officer

assigned to the U.S. Embassy, was given the task of

accompanying Flynn on his travels in the Soviet Union.
According to Melby, Flynn told him in the course of their
weeks together that FDR "hoped to get some kind of Kremlin

Vatican concordat, to end the feud between those two great
power bases." Melby confirmed that Molotov felt the Vatican
would be more troublesome on the issue,
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but told Flynn "...

-

n

go

ahead and talk with thec n
Pope and see how he feels
about
it." He said he believed
eneved ru„„
Flynn already knew the Pope
would
"if not enthusiastically,
still go along with the idea."
Melby said Flynn was so
confident an agreement would be
reached that Flynn asked him
if he would be interested
n

in

being his assistant in Rome
when Roosevelt appointed hi* to
serve as liaison between the
Vatican and the Kremlin. At the
same time Flynn told Melby not
to discuss what he had told
him with anyone from the State
Department "because neither

Stettinius nor anybody else in the State
Department knows
anything about it." According to Melby,

Flynn said "This is

a

straight White House operation." The only
one who would

have any information was Harriman.
In
to
8

the meantime,

[12]

the State Department was attempting

get some idea of what Flynn's mission was
about.

Grace Tully,

the President's secretary,

placed

the President's desk informing him that Mr.

State Department

telephoned with

a

to

memo on

Bohlen of the

message from Harriman

that Flynn was about to leave Moscow,

authorization

a

On March

and was seeking

make travel arrangements and to pay for

them. She said Bohlen told her "the State Department says

they do not know the nature of his work but if he is on an

official mission all they ask is that you send

a

chit over

authorizing them to pay for his expenses." Bohlen may have
been seeking to get some hint from FDR on the nature of what
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Flynn was up to ln Moscoh
any

infection

before he

^

?dr

„ as

ready

^
^

^^
0n

^
^ ^

^

^

simple »e n o to Secretary
Stettinius stating: "I hereby
authorize the State Department
to take care o £ all
expenses
in connection with
Honorable Edward J. Flynn £ co
„ fidential
mission abroad." [13]
.

On the same day the press
was reporting on Flynn's

audience with the Pope, Flynn
prepared

a

lengthy memorandum

for FDR that was sent to
Washington with Taylor's diplomatic

correspondence.

He

outlined for the President his

conversations with Molotov which centered,
as FDR's
conversation with Stalin at Teheran, on
the domestic
political reaction of American Catholics
to
Soviet

activities.

Flynn told Molotov "there are many millions
of

Roman Catholics in the United States" and that
"the

President was extremely anxious to create as good
feelings
as possible

between the people of the United States and the

Soviet Union."

He

pointed out "That

a

rapprochement between

the Soviet Union and the Vatican would do much to improve
the

relations between the two countries." Molotov repeatedly

stressed the Soviet position that the Vatican was openly
hostile to the Soviet Union,

and at one point commented that

the "Vatican had often made favorable steps towards Germany,

even Hitlerite Germany; but that it rarely had
to

a

good thing

say about the Soviet Union." Harriman raised the issue of
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the Hom an Catholic
Church i„ Polana and

t „.

Sovtet

,

s

intentions there. Moiotov
replied that "the Red Ar.v
h ad
liberated Poland and that
he had
Pt««« there had .„ , tt t , „ never heard that it.

„

the Polish people."

^^.^

^

[14]

Molotov claimed that the Soviet
Union respected all
religions as long as they did
not "interweave their policies
with Policies hostile to the
Sovxct Union." He was dealing
with politics and not religious
dogma and "the attitude of
the Vatican is not only not
friendly towards the Soviet
Union, but unneutral." Flynn said
Molotov thanked him for
the

frank exchange of views and promised
to give the matter

further consideration. He then said he
would inform his

colleagues of their conversations. This left
Flynn and
Harriman to believe "the door was deliberately
left open for
further conversations or for further action." He
concluded
it

was his personal opinion "that some sort of
rapprochement

might be worked out." [15]
The Flynn mission had attracted the attention of

more than just the western press. Writing in his diary on

March 23, Joseph Goebbels also commented on the Flynn

mission to the Pope noting "Clearly Roosevelt wants

to

win

the Catholic Church over to his side." Goebbels claimed the

Pope had been displeased with the results of the Yalta

Conference but that other considerations were at work as
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]

"The Americans are
Morking

cheat not o„ ly th . Sovtets

^^^^
„ Bt

also

in

backsround
British

^

^

o{

t

international game." Goebbels
oeooels aatf this point was
grasping
any straw which might ind-ir^f* , u
5
indicate a breakdown in
relations
between the »n ie , He

at

still held out, even at
this l.ts

date,

for

a

.irscle which would allow the
Reich

to

conclude

separate peace, and his
».i» ho pe still rested with the
Soviets
16
a

[

.

On March 23 Taylor wired
Secretary Stettinius that he

presented Flynn that morning to
Pius XII "following which
there ensued for forty-five
minutes a full review of Mr.
Flynn's recent visit to Russia, the
details of which are
Pledged to be strictly secret and as
there is no apparent
urgency in the situation I am convinced
that it would be

more appropriate for Mr. Flynn to report
to you in person
than through me by message." In spite of the
widespread

speculation in the press concerning the state of the
President's health there was "no apparent urgency" in
sending

a

diplomatic wire on the results of Flynn's talk

with the Pope. This view was reinforced on March 29 when

Flynn cabled Harriman that nothing had happened requiring

immediate attention but that if something did Taylor would

contact him. Flynn concluded by saying "Will write after
talk with President." [17]

164

Flynn arrived ln London
on
«ith Churchili and other
Brittsh

learned

^

^

^^^^

^ ^^.^
whiie tn

^

^

the President's
sudden death on April 12 He
immediately for Uachin.j.
Washington, faced with the
task of informing
of

.

a

new President of

»a

straight White House operation"
of

which the new occupant
knew nothing.

In

his memoirs,

Truman

says he met with Flynn
almost immediately upon his
return to
Washington, but that Flynn
brought up domestic politics
which he felt inappropriate
to discuss under the

circumstances. He told Flynn they
would get together at a
later date. For Flynn to have
brought up domestic politics
is entirely consistent with
the nature of his mission. FDR
had framed his discussions with
Stalin on Poland at Teheran
in terms of domestic political
considerations. Flynn's
discussions with Molotov revolved around FDR's
concern about
acceptance of Soviet policy in terms of American
public
opinion, particularly Catholic opinion. The entire
mission

revolved around domestic politics. Truman, however,
had no
idea what FDR was thinking when he sent Flynn to Moscow,
and

neither did anyone in the State Department.

[18]

Melby said Flynn sent word to him that he felt "pretty
sure that Mr. Truman, once he got used to the idea of being

President and got caught up on his homework, was going
tell him to go ahead and do it,

carry through with it."

Flynn was right. Truman's appointment calendar for July
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to

3,

as

he

was preparing for the
upcoming Potsdam Conference,

lists an appointment with
Flynn arranged by Democratic
National Committee Chairman
Robert Hannegan. Hannegan

apparently "thought [it was]
important for the President
talk with Hon.

Edward

to

Flynn before going to Big Three

J.

meeting." By this time Melby
was back in the United States,
having returned to attend the
San Francisco conference
opening the United Nations. He met
Flynn in New York who
told him "he was still very confident
that the thing

[Kremlin-Vatican concordat] was going on." Melby
also
confirmed that in Flynn's meetings with Pius

the Pope,

not enthusiastic had expressed interest
and told him,

while
"Go

ahead and see what you can do. See what we can
work out."
The available evidence suggests then that Flynn
had

commitments from both Molotov and Pius XII
seek

a

resolution.

to

continue to

[19]

The Potsdam Conference marked the beginning of

a

new

era in the nature of U.S.

-

been urging FDR to take

a

harder line with the Soviets since

the previous September.

Relations had steadily worsened over

Soviet relations. Harriman had

the Polish issue and the question of the makeup of the

Polish government since the end of the Yalta Conference.

Harriman reported that Stalin seemed genuinely shaken by

Roosevelt's death, but said he assumed there would be no
changes in policy. He agreed to Harriman's suggestion that
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^

^

Molotov attend lhe opening
cerenonie£ of
ns
in San Francisco as
a gesture of
respect for the dead
President. In aid-April Tru*a„
gathered his foreign poiicy
advisors to assess the situation
regarding U.S. -Soviet
relations
[20
.

]

The record of this meeting
reveals there indeed would
be

a

change in Policy. Harriman restated
his concern,

^pressed
September,

in

a

Personal memo to Harry Hopkins the
Previous

that the Soviets viewed the American
attitude of

"generosity and cooperation" as

a

sign of weakness and

approval of their policies. Terming the
current Soviet
activity a "barbarian invasion of Europe"
Harriman said
Soviet control of

a

country meant the extension of the

Soviet system complete with secret police,
extinction of

freedom of speech and other freedoms. Truman repeatedly

expressed his intent to be "firm" with the Russians. The
new

President said the Russians needed us more than we needed
them and that while he did not "expect to get 100 percent of
what we wanted... on important matters he felt that we should
be

able to get 85 percent."

[21]

President Truman did not share FDR's belief that
giving the Soviets their way in eastern Europe was
for establishing an atmosphere of trust.
he did not share FDR's belief,

a

method

More importantly,

as expressed

to

Spellman in

September of 1943, that the United States would not play an
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]

important role in Europe
aft

„

^^^

the

circle of advisors he was
gatherin s around hi,, were
believers in the concept of
the "American Century"
Proclaimed hy Henry Luce in
1941. i ruma „ brought . „ ore
nationalist viewpoint to the
Presidency in contrast to FDR's
internationalist viewpoint.

Nonetheless, in September, with the
war in the Pacific
over, and relations with the
Soviets becoming increasingly
acrimonious, Truman approved a resumption
of the Flynn
miSSi0n The New York Time* reported
on September 12 that
-

Flynn,

after meeting with Truman at the White
House,

return to Rome and Moscow to complete

a

"would

special diplomatic

mission he undertook for President Roosevelt."
However,
Flynn suffered

a

heart attack in early November,

never able to reopen the discussions

.[

and was

22

Roosevelt's death probably ended what little chance of
success that existed for achieving
the Vatican and the Kremlin,

a

rapprochement between

although Truman did approve

resumption of Flynn's mission. Stalin had already set in
motion his plan to make the Russian Orthodox Church an

instrument of Soviet policy, and without the influence of
FDR to attempt

a

compromise in the Soviet attitude "to do

open battle against the influence of the Vatican," the

result could only be

a

hardening of American Catholic

anti-Communist opinion. Each new episode of Soviet
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a

anti-Catholic activity in
Eastern Europg brQught
wave of publicity, and
statements

^

&

^

from high ranking

of

the Catholic hierarchy
and Catholic politicians.

Catholics were not the only
Americans with an aversion to
Communism. However, their growing
political strength
combined with the official ant i
-Communist position of the
church led to the series of
policy conflicts outlined here.
In turn FDR's postwar
planning took into account early in
the war Catholic attitudes and
the prospect,

which he tried

to

head off,

of

renewed charges of Roosevelt sympathy
for

Communism. When Joseph McCarthy stood
before the Republican
convention in 1952 and charged the Democrats
with twenty
years of treason, millions of Catholics and
millions of
other Americans were willing to believe him.
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